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THE ICEBOX COMETH: A FORMER CLERK'S VIEW OF
THE PROPOSED NINTH CIRCUIT SPLIT
Jennifer E. Spreng*
Abstract: Most academic commentators oppose splitting the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. They argue that the court's size is a virtue and either deny that the court has size-
related problems, such as workload, consistency, and reversal rate, or claim that a split would
not address these problems. The U.S. Congress, however, is less sure. It has appointed the
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the United States Courts and asked it to study a
possible Ninth Circuit split. This Article provides an "insider's view," that of a former elbow
clerk, and reveals that a split would significantly decrease the court's workload and increase
its consistency and predictability. The so-named "icebox split," which would sever Alaska,
Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington from the Ninth Circuit and create a new Twelfth
Circuit, would best improve the administration of justice without violating other important
policies governing circuit boundary setting for a definable group of Americans knit together
by common interests. This Article concludes that the Ninth Circuit should be split and a new
circuit created from the icebox states.
Chief Inspector Morse: What are the twin bases for successful
detection, Lewis?
Sergeant Lewis: Confession and information, sir.
Chief Inspector Morse: Well done. Now, what we need is
information. And who are the best informed people in any [Oxford]
college?
(Sergeant Lewis shakes his head)
Chief Inspector Morse: The Scouts, Lewis. They put the drunks to
bed; they clean up the vomit; they wake the sober, whether singly
or in pairs. They are discrete, maternal, devoted, exploited, and
they know everything.'
* Associate, Moore, Malone & Safreed, Owensboro, Kentucky. Former clerk to the Honorable
Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Honorable F.A. Little, Jr., U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Louisiana. Former professional staff member with the House
Wednesday Group, U.S. Congress. ..D., 1995; Saint Louis University School of Law, magna cum
laude. B.A. in American history, 1990, Washington and Lee University, magna cum laude.
1. The Last Enemy (British Broadcasting Corp. 1989) (starring John Thaw and based on
characters created by novelist Colin Dexter).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1940s, many Pacific Northwesterners have been
searching for a way to sever their region from the huge Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.2 In the fall of 1997, Congress passed a bill to create a
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals 3 to study realignment of the appellate courts in the wake of the
most concerted congressional effort to split the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals since the 1970s.4 Although every Congress in this decade has
considered splitting the Ninth Circuit, no such bill had passed either
house until 1997 when the Senate backed a plan in an appropriations bill
rider to create a Twelfth Circuit.' That circuit would have included
Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington.
California, Guam, Nevada, and the Northern Marianas would have
remained in the Ninth Circuit.
Although Congress ultimately created the Commission instead of
restructuring the Ninth Circuit, the Commission's work was not intended
to be, nor has it been, a stalling tactic or whitewash job. In fact, its
executive director, University of Virginia Professor Daniel J. Meador, is
the co-author of a book that twenty years ago endorsed creating the most
sensible Twelfth Circuit so far proposed: the Icebox Circuit of Alaska,
Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington Circumstances may have
changed in the past two decades,8 but whatever the Commission
2. See Thomas E. Baker, Rationing Justice on Appeal: The Problems of the U.S. Courts of
Appeals 100 (1994).
3. Chief Justice William Rehnquist appointed the Commission's members, which include former
Supreme Court Justice Byron White, Sixth Circuit Judge Gilbert S. Merritt, Ninth Circuit Judge
Pamela Rymer, U.S. District Court Judge from Arizona William Browning, and former American
Bar Association President N. Lee Cooper. Panel Chosen to Study Federal Appeals Court System,
Assoc. Press, Dec. 19, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4897505.
4. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 Stat. 2491, 2492 (1997).
5. See Carl Tobias, "Judicial Genymandering" Would Split the 9th Circuit, S.F. Exam., Aug. 11,
1997, at A13. The House ultimately rejected the idea for 1997, and the two houses of Congress
compromised on a scheme to create the Commission.
6. Id.
7. Paul D. Carrington et al., Justice on Appeal 203 (1976).
8. In 1975, the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System (Hruska
Commission) claimed that an appellate court might not be able to function with more than nine
judges. That view turned out to be wrong. Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate
System, Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975)
[hereinafter Hruska Report II].
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ultimately concludes, it is apparent that the Ninth Circuit's structure is
finally on the table, if not the chopping block.
The Tentative Draft Report the Commission released on October 7,
1998 confirms it.9 The Commission proposed that the Ninth Circuit be
reorganized into "three regionally based adjudicative divisions" of at
least seven active judges.' The Northern Division would consist of the
icebox states." The Middle Division would consist of the Districts of
Northern and Eastern California, Hawaii, Nevada, Guam and the
Northern Marianas Islands. 2 The Southern Division would include
Arizona and the Districts of Central and Southern California. 3 Each
Ninth Circuit judge would be assigned to one of the regional divisions.
Although not all of the judges assigned to each division would actually
reside in the area, a majority of each division's judges would be resident
there.' 4 Decisions in one division would not bind any other, and each
division would have its own internal en banc procedure. 5 To resolve
decisional conflicts between the division, the Commission proposes a
"Circuit Division" of the Chief Judge, and the presiding judge plus one
other circuit judge from each regional division. 6 The circuit-wide en
banc process would be abolished. 7 After receiving public comment on
the tentative draft report proposals, the Commission will submit a final
report to the President and Congress on December 17, 1998.1
The Commission came as close to the edge of the circuit-splitting
canyon as it could without actually falling over. Its proposal recognizes
the regional integrity of the icebox states and tries to fashion a remedy
taking into account many problems the Ninth Circuit faces specifically
9. See Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Fed. Courts of Appeals, Tentative Draft
Report (Oct. 1998) (visited Oct. 10, 1990) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov.report/appstruc.pdf>.
10. Id. at 39.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at41.
15. Id.
16. Id. at41-42.
17. Id. at42.
18. Press Release from the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals, Appellate Study Commission Issues Draft Report for Public Comment, Oct. 7, 1998 (on file
with author).
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due to its size, such as certain types of work,' 9 consistency and
predictability,2" collegiality,2 and regionalization.' For those very
reasons, the Commission should consider recommending in its final
report that its Northern Division, the icebox states, be fashioned into
their own circuit. If not, Congress would still do well to consider the
Commission's views very carefully, because, as this Article will show,
there is much to recommend them. Then, Congress should take the step
the Commission felt it could not, and split the icebox states from Ninth
Circuit altogether.
As a matter of pure congressional politics, the Ninth Circuit is
probably at greatest risk of dismemberment since it took shape in 1891 .
Slade Gorton of Washington and Conrad Bums of Montana, along with
other northwestern Republicans in the Senate, pushed for a split for
years, but the recent Republican takeover of Congress and Senators
Bums and Gorton's seniority have placed their concerns on the national
agenda.24 Importantly, the powerful senior senator from Alaska and
appropriations committee chairman, Ted Stevens, grabbed the leadership
of the Ninth Circuit split movement after the court issued an opinion that
19. Id. at 27, 42-44 (noting that Ninth Circuit judges are currently hampered in producing high-
quality work because they do not have time to read all of court's decisions and that en bane burden
needs to be reduced "to a more manageable level"); cf discussion infra Part III.A (arguing that
splitting Ninth Circuit would measurably decrease workload caused by en bane cases, death penalty
cases, and review of court's opinions for judges in both new Twelfth Circuit and new Ninth).
20. Tentative Draft Report, supra note 9, at 27, 42-44 (noting that smaller adjudicative units may
produce more consistent and predictable circuit law because it is easier for judges to monitor
circuit's opinions and it is easier for local bar to "know" court); cf. discussion infra Part fLI.B (noting
that limited en bane procedure, "unknown" bench, number of "outlier views" on Ninth Circuit, and
attractiveness of "rolling the dice" on appeal are all causes or effects of Ninth Circuit's lack of
consistency and predictability that are function of its size).
21. Tentative Draft Report, supra note 9, at 38-39 (noting that "consistent, predictable, coherent
development of the law over time is best fostered in a decisional unit that is small enough for the
kind of close, continual, collaborative decisionmaking that 'seeks the objective of as much
excellence in a group's decision as its combined talents, experience, and energy permit"'); cf
discussion infra Part II.C (stating that Ninth Circuit has collegiality problems that two smaller
circuits could alleviate).
22. Tentative Draft Report, supra note 9, at 44-45 (noting that divisional arrangement within
circuit would "restor[e] a sense of connection between the court and the regions within the circuit"
while still "respect[ing] the character of the West as a distinct region"); cf discussion infra Part llI.D
(arguing that regional polarization on Ninth Circuit threatens legitimacy of court and impairs court's
ability to perform its appropriate federalization function).
23. The Ninth Circuit was formed in 1891 and Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, and Guam were added
later. See Baker, supra note 2, at 76.
24. See, e.g., Ann Donnelly, Fairness Demands Split of Ninth Circuit Appeals Court, Columbian,
Aug. 3, 1997, atB9.
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confounded many Alaskans' understanding of natives' claims on the
state's land.' All this occurred against the backdrop of yet another
Supreme Court term in which the high court reversed decisions in more
than ninety-six percent of the Ninth Circuit cases it heard.26 The only real
question left may be whether the powerful Republican senators from the
northwest can convince their equally powerful Republican House
colleagues from California to go along with a split plan.
Perhaps they can. The Ninth Circuit faces numerous challenges due to
its size and extraordinary workload, and some of these challenges have
degenerated into real problems. The circuit currently has twenty-two
active judges of the twenty-eight authorized by statute,27 and they are
assisted by sixteen senior judges. By contrast, the next largest circuit, the
Fifth Circuit, has its full complement of seventeen authorized active
judges and a mere four senior judges. The Ninth Circuit's vastness
increases workload, because the larger a circuit's population, the more
cases it will produce that require all of the judges' attention. Too many
judges and cases eliminate economies of scale and create administrative
inefficiency. The more judges, the less opportunity each judge will have
to sit on a panel with each other judge, making collegiality and
sometimes even civility difficult. Such a large court begins to look and
act more like a legislature. Finally, the court's jurisdiction sweeps over at
least two definable geographic regions, pitting two very different cultural
and legal outlooks against each other in what appears to be a battle for
domination. The Ninth Circuit displays all of these unattractive
25. Alaska er rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist v. Venetie Tribal Gov't, 101 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 1996),
rev'd, 11 S. Ct. 948 (1998) (concluding that "Indian Country" existed in Alaska). Most Alaskans
believed that the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) had abolished Indian Country in
the state. The decision prompted both Ted Stevens and Energy Committee Chairman Frank
Murkowski to take on a higher profile in the split debate. Stevens's interest is critical because his
role as Senate Appropriations Committee chairman gives split backers the opportunity to trade a vote
with every senator who wants spending in his state. In fact, Stevens pushed the split package through
as a rider to one of his committee's bills. See David Whitney, 9th Circuit Split Clears Roadblock,
Anch. Daily News, July 25, 1997, at Al; see also Carol Ostrom, Fuming Senators Ready to Carve
Up 9th Circuit, Seattle Times, Nov. 2, 1997, at Al.
26. The Ninth has had a disproportionately high reversal rate for almost 15 years with only a brief
respite in the early 1990s. William Carlsen, Frontier Justice, S.F. Chron., Oct. 6, 1996, available in
1996 WL 3228822. The Supreme Court reversed only two-thirds of all the cases it heard in 1996-
97. Bob Egelko, Senate Short-Circuits 9th with Vote to Split Court, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Aug.
18, 1997, atBl.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 44 (1994).
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attributes, and they all arise from a structural deficiency. In short: "the
circuit is too large and has too many cases."2
To say that the Ninth Circuit has problems is not to say they are of the
judges' making, however. What is quite remarkable about the Ninth
Circuit is how the judges have papered over their circuit's structural
deficiencies with goodwill. Every time a Ninth Circuit judge drafts his
own electronic mail to his colleagues, instead of having a clerk do it, he
minimizes the "cocoon problem." Every time a judge decides not to call
for en banc rehearing of a case just because she believes the case is
completely wrong, she minimizes the workload problem.29 Every time a
judge struggles a little longer with the multiple precedents controlling
immigration and social security disability issues, he minimizes the
consistency problem. Every time a judge makes an extra effort to go out
to lunch or dinner with another judge she does not know well, she helps
solve the collegiality problem. Unfortunately, there are limits to the
structural problems goodwill can mitigate; at some point, there are only
structural solutions to structural problems. For this reason, the icebox
cometh.
Opponents of the split claim that split backers have the "burden of
persuasion" in this debate."0 Admittedly, pointing out that the circuit is
structurally deficient does not answer the question of whether two
smaller circuits is the answer to the problem. Hopefully, the nation's
decision on the split will be based on a balancing of costs and benefits.
The difficulty will be determining how to identify the costs and benefits
and how much they weigh. Professor Arthur Hellman, perhaps the top
expert on the internal administration of the Ninth Circuit has suggested a
way of analyzing the merits of arguments in favor of the split: evaluate
whether (1) serious problems exist that warrant change, (2) the proposed
changes will cure or substantially mitigate the problems, and (3) the
proposed changes will be less undesirable than the problems being
remedied.3' Hellman's proposed analysis is worth bearing in mind, but it
is important to keep our eyes on the bottom line: whether the Ninth
28. Donnelly, supra note 24, at B9 (quoting Ninth Circuit Judge Andrew J. Kleinfeld).
29. En banc rehearing on the Ninth Circuit is the process of rehearing a case by 11 judges after a
three judge-panel has already issued a decision. 9th Cir. R. 35-3. On all other courts, en banc
rehearing is done before the full court. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1994).
30. See, e.g., Procter Hug, Jr., The Ninth Circuit Should Not Be Split, 57 Mont. L. Rev. 291, 295
(1996).
31. Arthur D. Hellman, Dividing the Ninth Circuit: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come, 57
Mont. L. Rev. 261,263 (1996).
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Circuit has problems we cannot live with and whether splitting the circuit
would address those problems in a meaningful way.32 Split backers can
meet that burden without difficulty.
In fact, opponents of the split have the burden of persuasion exactly
backwards. Burdens of persuasion have little meaning in the context of a
policy debate in Congress; after all, Congress is not a court. Most split
opponents underrate the significance of the fact that many of the elected
representatives from several northwestern states have consistently
supported a split in this decade and that their growing interest in a split
probably reflects the views of a majority of their constituents.33 The
popularity of a policy alone is no hallmark of its virtue, but the United
States is a democracy. If the people of several northwestern states want a
separate circuit, that support states a prima facie case in favor of a split.
It does not matter if their reasons seem "silly." The courts are merely
another arm of the government, and the government exists for the benefit
of people. The real burden is on the opponents of the split: Can they
persuade us that the split these people want is a bad idea or that their
reasons for maintaining the current borders are more worthy than the
reasoning of split supporters? They cannot succeed in carrying that
burden.34
Part II of this Article starts by exploring the split proposals actually on
the table, evaluating them based on oft-applied criteria, and concludes
that a legislative package of the icebox configuration of northwest states,
32. To take what I believe to be a relevant example, published opinions provide some evidence
that the Ninth Circuit is currently having collegiality problems. See infra Part III.C. These problems
may not be worse than in other circuits, but that is no reason not to improve matters in the Ninth
Circuit if it can be done by splitting the circuit without too much disruption. It is also reasonable to
conclude either that due to the size of the court, it will be much more difficult to overcome these
problems within the current structure or that these problems may become intractably worse in the
future. In other words, structural considerations may or may not have caused the problem, but they
have made collegiality problems extremely difficult to solve. Splitting the circuit, which is already a
statistical outlier from a size perspective, might mitigate or solve the problem. It is irrelevant that
smaller circuits may have collegiality problems as well because they could be due to completely
different reasons. Maybe the judges on the smaller circuit are simply hard to get along with. A
different solution, or perhaps no solution, should be addressed to that problem.
33. At least it is not an issue where their disagreement with their elected representatives is so
profound as to cause them to turn the rascals out!
34. As Justice Anthony Kennedy has written to the Commission on Structural Alternatives, "A
court which seeks to retain its authority to bind nearly one-fifth of the people of the United States by
the decisions of its three-judge panels, many of which include visiting Circuit or District Judges,
must meet a heavy burden of persuasion." Letter from Justice Anthony Kennedy to Justice Byron
White (Aug. 17, 1998) (visited Sept. 24, 1998) <http:// app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/submittedl
pdfikennedy/pdf>.
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perhaps sweetened with additional judges for the states left behind, is
intrinsically the most attractive proposal for change. Part III identifies the
"real" problems of the Ninth Circuit and shows how the icebox
configuration would solve them, therefore carrying the burden split
opponents assign to split backers. Part IV answers many of the
arguments against the split, demonstrating that split backers cannot carry
what is actually their burden in the court of public opinion. The Article
concludes that the icebox split is the best way to improve the
administration of justice for as many people as possible in the short and
medium terms and to provide the most flexible base from which
additional realignment can occur in the future.
My conclusions run counter to the work of many top academic
commentators." Their impressive and almost-scientific studies of court
administration cast doubt on the more intuitive arguments in favor of
splitting the circuit. Our time in history is one in which decisionmakers
often put greater stock in scientific explanations of social phenomena
than in the evidence of our own eyes. But there are more ways to study
government institutions than just regression analysis. As many respected
political scientists know, one excellent way to understand how a
government institution and its constituent members behave is to become
part of that institution.36 What better way is there to become part of the
35. See, e.g, Baker, supra note 2, at 218-20; Hellman, supra note 31; Carl Tobias, The
Impoverished Idea of Circuit Splitting, 44 Emory L.J. 1357 (1995).
36. See, e.g., Richard Fenno, The Making of a Senator: Dan Quayle at ix (1989). This book was
part of a major project by University of Rochester Professor Richard Fenno to describe and account
for the relationship between a senator's work at home, campaigning, and his work in Washington,
governing. Fenno explains:
My vantage point has been the view "over the shoulder" of Senator Quayle and his staff. My
perspective has been their perspective. I have not tried to watch or talk to other relevant actors in
the events described herein-although I have come across some of them in the normal course of
my research. And I have relied, at several points, on the accounts and judgments of interested
political reporters-the media scorekeepers.
Id. My vantage point is Fenno's, with a twist. Not only did I look over the shoulder, literally as well
as figuratively, of a relevant actor on the Ninth Circuit-Judge Andrew J. Kleinfeld-but I actually
became part of the court administration process as his elbow clerk.
I have worked hard to avoid allowing my general observations about how the Ninth Circuit or a
judge's chambers operates to degenerate into mere descriptions of how Judge Kleinfeld's chambers
operates. Observing the court at work teaches that every judge is different, which makes
generalizations quite difficult to make.
In a number of cases, my experience as a clerk for Judge Kleinfeld was different from what I
believe to be the average experience for clerks (which no clerk may ever actually experience); in
other cases, our chambers was in the middle of the mainstream. Clerks share insights about their
chambers and the clerking experience. I observed the work that came into our office from other
Vol. 73:875, 1998
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Ninth Circuit, and therefore to understand the issues swirling about the
split debate, than to become a Ninth Circuit clerk? After all, the staff
"know[s] everything,""7 right? Even if that is not quite true, comparing
the conventional wisdom as stated in the many academic studies of the
Ninth Circuit's institutional behavior with a first-hand view of the circuit
at work teaches once again that "things are seldom what they seem" to
outside observers.38
II. WHAT'S ON THE TABLE? THE VARIOUS PROPOSED SPLITS
A. Background
The Ninth Circuit currently includes more states than any other of the
eleven regional circuits: Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii,
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Northern Marianas, Oregon, and Washington.39
Unless Congress decides to embark on a more extensive reorganization
of the appellate courts,4" the multiple circuits that will result from a Ninth
Circuit split or reorganization will include some configuration of these
states. A considerable amount of opposition to splitting the circuit over
the years has centered around specific configurations for the new Twelfth
Circuit.4" Therefore, it is useful to take a look at some of those proposals
chambers, and I had the opportunity to soak in the culture of the court. Obviously, personal
experience plays a role in my views, but the opportunity to observe judges at work does so as well.
37. The Last Enemy, supra note 1.
38. HMSPinafore (Gilbert & Sullivan 1878).
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994). The D.C. Circuit and the Federal Circuit are more like the subject
matter circuits Professor Daniel Meador has proposed. Daniel Meador, Struggling Against the Tower
of Babel, in Restructuring Justice: The Innovations of the Ninth Circuit and the Future of the
Federal Courts 195, 200-01 (Arthur Hellman ed., 1990).
40. There are good reasons not to reorganize the federal courts beyond dividing the Ninth Circuit,
as the Hruska Commission realized. The Fifth Circuit split of 1981 proved that it is possible to
preserve the stability of stare decisis, even when a circuit splits. See Baker, supra note 2, at 68-69.
That would be much more difficult if Congress reorganizes all the circuit borders. Further, the
Hruska Commission found loyalty with the judiciary and the bar for the current circuits. Commission
on the Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Geographical Boundaries of the Several
Judicial Circuits: Alternative Proposals, 62 F.RD. 223, 228 (1973) [hereinafter Hruska Report I].
As a practical matter, Congress has never seriously considered a complete reorganization of the
circuits and is unlikely to embark on that sea in the near future. See Baker, supra note 2, at 216-18;
Conrad Bums, Dividing the Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals: A Proposition Long Overdue, 57 Mont.
L. Rev. 245,259 (1996).
41. See, e.g., Hug, supra note 30, at 307; Carl Tobias, Why Congress Should Not Split the Ninth
Circuit, 50 SMU L. Rev. 583, 591-94 (1997).
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to consider a threshold question: Would a split be very attractive as a
practical matter?
Any modem discussion of federal appellate court structures and
internal reforms begins with the mid-1970s work of the Commission on
Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, or the "Hruska
Commission," nicknamed after its chairman, Senator Roman Hruska.
The Hruska Commission's two reports, one on circuit court boundaries,42
and the other on internal reforms,43 cast a long shadow over the
legislative debate on court administration that lingers today." The
Commission's primary contributions were its proposals that the two
largest circuits, the Fifth and the Ninth, be split,45 numerous judgeships
be added,46 and the following criteria be used in evaluating future
proposed circuit splits:
a. Circuits should include at least three states;
b. No circuit should have only one state;
c. No circuit should be created that would immediately require
more than nine active judges;
d. Circuits should contain states with a diversity of population,
business and interests, in order to maintain the national character
of the court;
e. Realignment should involve as little dislocation of circuit
boundaries as possible, with dislocation being justified by other
criteria;
f. No circuit should contain noncontiguous states.47
42. Hruska Report I, supra note 40.
43. Hnrska Report II, supra note 8.
44. Many government and private studies of the federal courts followed those of the Hruska
Commission, but none matches it for the fertility of the ground it broke in the court administration
debate, the number of recommendations implemented, and the prescience of its warnings. For a
summary of these efforts, see Baker, supra note 2, at 37-43. According to Baker, not many of the
Hruska Commission's recommendations were in fact implemented, but the Commission did better
than those that followed. Id. The Fifth Circuit was ultimately split in the formulation the
Commission had proposed. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 35, at 1362. Many of its efficiency
proposals were tried and Congress adopted the Commission's primary strategy of adding judges to
cope with workload, and all split proposals are still judged first by the Hruska Commission's criteria.
45. Hruska Report 1, supra note 40, at 230-37. Several giants of the legal academy endorsed the
Hruska Commission's circuit splitting proposals. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 7, at 202-03.
46. Hruska Report !, supra note 40, at 230.
47. Id. at 231-32.
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Congress did not initially follow the Commission's advice. Congress
first responded to the two split proposals by permitting circuits with
more than fifteen judges to organize themselves into administrative units
and perform their en banc functions with fewer than all their judges,
instead of splitting either circuit.4" That solution turned out to be
unsatisfactory to the Fifth Circuit. In the 1970s, the Fifth Circuit was
experiencing an unprecedented explosion in caseload due mostly to civil
rights filings.49 It followed the mandate of the new law by reorganizing
itself into administrative units, but it could not bear to sacrifice its full-
court en banc procedure for fear of destroying the law of the circuit."
Nevertheless, twenty-four and twenty-six judge en banc proceedings
ultimately proved too unwieldy, and the Fifth Circuit's judges asked
Congress to split the circuit.5 Congress did so in 1981, essentially
following the blueprint the Hruska Commission had suggested: putting
Alabama, Florida, and Georgia into a new Eleventh Circuit, and leaving
Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi in what would become the new Fifth
Circuit.5
The Fifth Circuit experience provides a valuable lesson when
considering proposals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit of the
1970s was already showing symptoms of the problems its critics
complain of today: excessive reliance on visiting and district judges to
fill out panels, inconsistent decisions by different panels, and a
breakdown in the en banc process due to disuse, understaffing, and
delay. 3 Yet, instead of making merely tentative attempts at internal
reform, the court resisted splitting by enthusiastically reorganizing into
three administrative units, implementing numerous efficiency
mechanisms, and adopting a limited en banc procedure. 4 Although the
48. Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1633, 1633 reads:
Any court of appeals having more than 15 active judges may constitute itself into administrative
units complete with such facilities and staff as may be prescribed by the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts, and may perform its en banc function by such number of members
of its en banc courts as may be prescribed by rule of the court of appeals.
49. Baker, supra note 2, at 59-60.
50. The Fifth Circuit rejected a limited en banc procedure partly because the law of the circuit
would be held hostage to the luck of the draw. Id. at 62-63.
51. Id. at 64.
52. Act of Oct. 14, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, § 5, 94 Stat. 1994, 1994; Hruska Report I, supra
note 40, at 233.
53. Hruska Report 1, supra note 40, at 234-35.
54. Baker, supra note 2, at 78-83.
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Ninth Circuit contained only thirteen judges when it embarked on this
project, twenty-eight active judges are now authorized55 and twenty-two
are currently sitting. 6 As will be discussed below, the Circuit's problems
of the 1970s have gotten worse, and the Circuit is now troubled by
others. Therefore, it is worth looking again at how the Ninth Circuit
might be split to see if any practical configurations exists. The Hruska
Commission criteria will be our guide,57 despite the fact that even the
Commission's former deputy Executive Director has criticized them. 8
B. Potential Split Configurations
1. Horsecollar Circuit
From the perspective of trying to divide the Ninth Circuit in half,
reformers face a practical problem. Approximately sixty percent of the
court's caseload comes from California. 9 Therefore, one cannot divide
the circuit into two equal parts without dividing California. Ergo, the
55. 28 U.S.C. § 44 (1994).
56. Congress had not confirmed any of President Clinton's appointments since the Honorable A.
Wallace Tashima and the Honorable Sidney R. Thomas on January 4, 1996 until early 1998. Active
manpower on the court had dropped to eighteen judges. The Honorable Barry G. Silverman was
commissioned on February 6, 1998, the Honorable Susan P. Graber on April 1, 1998, the Honorable
M. Margaret McKeown on April 8, 1998, and the Honorable Kim Wardlaw on July 31, 1998. The
Ninth Circuit remains below statutorily authorized full strength, and Ninth Circuit judges write
openly of needing as many as 38 judges. By contrast, the new Fifth Circuit has its full complement
of 17 authorized active judges.
57. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 2, at 77-78.
58. Hellman, Dividing the Ninth Circuit, supra note 31, at 262. Professor Hellman argues:
[L]ittle weight should be given to the 1973 report of the Commission on Revision of the Federal
Court Appellate System [IHruska Commission], which recommended that the Ninth Circuit be
divided into two new circuits. That recommendation has been outdistanced by events, and it
cannot persuasively be invoked in support of the current legislation.
Id. Professor Hellman's disclaimer is not persuasive. He refers in particular to the Commission's
recommendation that each circuit include no more than nine judges, which is obviously now
unrealistic (and therefore, deserves no more discussion), and its recommendation to ban one-state
circuits, which is not relevant in the Icebox Circuit debate. Id. at 265. Professor Hellman points out
that more recent studies disapprove of circuit splitting, but their reasons are consistent with the
Hruska Commission's general criteria. Id. He cites specifically more recent reports' concerns with
disrupting precedent and administration, which the Hruska criteria mention, as well as the need for
solid evidence of judicial dysfunction to justify circuit splitting, which is just a different way of
saying the benefits of a split must outweigh the considerable costs. Id. at 267-68. No one is arguing
with that. Perhaps Professor Hellman doth protest too much.
59. Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, A Ninth Circuit Split Study Commission: Now What?, 57 Mont. L.
Rev. 313, 318 (1996).
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proposal divides the circuit by doing the next best thing: isolating
California and creating a Twelfth Circuit of "everything else," which
surrounds California like a horsecollar.0
This proposal is not aesthetically pleasing. Aside from a host of not-
well-understood federalism concerns that arise from a one-state circuit,61
the resulting Twelfth Circuit does not make any sense. Why should
Alaska and Arizona, Nevada and Washington be in the same judicial
circuit? To make up for what can only be those "marriages of
convenience," the horsecollar configuration does not even have the merit
of dividing the circuit in half.62 A horsecollar split would probably do
what the Fifth Circuit split did: produce two circuits burdened by size
instead of just one.63
2. Stringbean Circuit
In 1995, the Senate considered a configuration that became known as
the Stringbean Circuit, in deference to its long, skinny shape. 64 The
configuration included everything but California, Hawaii, and the
territories in the Ninth Circuit, Northern Marianas, and Guam in a new
Twelfth Circuit.65 Given that Hawaii does not even have an active judge
at the moment, and would probably only be entitled to one, the
stringbean Circuit would virtually create a one-state circuit. It has all the
problems of the horsecollar configuration as well as another one: poor
Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Marianas and their 300 filings in 1996
would be overwhelmed by California's 4,840.66
60. Id.
61. Other concerns include a lack of diversity among the judges and the danger that senior
senators from the state where a judgeship is being filled, who have considerable influence over the
President's court appointments, could essentially pack a court. See Hruska Report I, supra note 40,
at 237.
62. This is one of the reasons that made the Hruska Commission reject such a split, in addition to
the fact that it would create a one-state circuit. Id.
63. Baker, supra note 2, at 70-71.
64. See O'Scannlain, supra note 59, at 317.
65. Bums, supra note 40, at 249.
66. See Hug, supra note 30, at 308.
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3. 1997 Senate Plan
The split proposal that the Senate passed in a 1997 appropriations
rider has similar problems. It would have left California, Nevada and the
islands alone in the new Ninth Circuit, leaving Nevada, instead of
Hawaii, at California's mercy. 7 By the Hruska Commission's standards,
the 1997 Senate proposal is even worse than the stringbean proposal,
because it would have kept a noncontiguous state, Arizona, in the
Twelfth Circuit.68 If the circuit is to be split, there must be a better way.
4. Hruska Split
Another recent effort to divide the circuit, a 1993 bill introduced by
Oregon Representative Michael Kopetski, pilfered the substance of its
proposal from the first Hruska Report.6 9 That bold blueprint proposed
splitting not just the Ninth Circuit, but California as well.7" The southern
and central districts would go with Nevada and Arizona and the northern
and eastern districts would go with the northwest states and the islands."
This approach would do what the stringbean and horsecollar
configurations could not-effectively divide the circuit in half.72
The Hruska Commission studied the unique situation of splitting one
state between two circuits, and concluded that it could be managed." The
division of California might be less cumbersome than it seems. Different
panels of Ninth Circuit judges decide similar state law cases all the time,
with potentially differing results, and no en banc or Supreme Court
67. At least in the short term, Nevada has two active judges, including the Chief Judge, Procter
Hug, Jr.
68. The problem is that no state wants to stay with California unless it has a lot of company.
Arizona is no different. Arizona probably ended up in the proposed Twelfth Circuit because it was
the only way the split backers could get Arizona's senators to go along, and they must have needed
that support. See Tobias, supra note 5. It is unlikely that northwestern Republicans viewed southern
Arizona, with its two active judges appointed by Democratic presidents (including the one who
would be Chief Judge, Mary Schroeder) as an ideal addition to their new circuit. From this
perspective, it is not surprising that Congress ultimately decided not to split the circuit this way; it is
clearly not the best approach from either a northwestern political perspective or a nonpartisan
practical perspective.
69. Bums, supra note 40, at 247-48.
70. Hruska Report I, supra note 40, at 235-36.
71. Id.
72. O'Scannlain, supra note 59, at 321. It was also nearly a 50-50 split in 1974. Hntska Report I,
supra note 40, at 236.
73. Hruska Reportl, supra note 40, at 238-40.
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review of diversity decisions exists as a practical matter.74 The more
sobering thought is how splitting California would influence litigation
strategies." The Hruska Commission took a "where there's a will, there's
a way," approach to these questions, but the fact that the Commission
repeatedly suggested new civil rules to solve these problems suggests the
need for more study before Congress adopts a similar proposal.76
The Hruska split has one merit the horsecollar and stringbean
configurations lack. It collects two groups of jurisdictions with roughly
similar regional interests: the Pacific Northwest plus northern California,
which seem to "go together," and the southwest plus southern California,
which also go together. At minimum, the two circuits so constituted
would confuse preschool viewers of Sesame Street's "One of These
Things Is Not Like the Other," when they could not find the state in each
group that did not fit.
The Hruska split has the same disadvantage as the horsecollar split,
however. Instead of solving the problem of one large circuit, it creates
two new ones with no future solution in sight. The Fifth Circuit split
created two large circuits with only three states; each circuit defies
additional splitting to address what is now a serious size problem.77 Like
the new Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, it is difficult to see how the new
Ninth and Twelfth Circuits could be split a generation from now if one
became unmanageably large again. The Hruska split would probably be
the end of the line for circuit splitting in the west; there would be no
obvious future stopgap solution available. Nevertheless, the Hruska
configuration has sufficient merit that it should not be quickly dismissed.
74. Diversity cases never go en bane on state law issues; the job of a federal court in a diversity
case is not to make law but to apply what state law it can find. See Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938). The Supreme Court will also not give litigants a third bite at the judicial apple in diversity
cases. Bishop v. Woods, 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
75. See Arthur D. Hellman, Legal Problems of Dividing a State Between Federal Judicial
Circuits, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1188 (1974).
76. Hruska Report I, supra note 40, at 239.
77. The new Fifth Circuit's filings caught up to the number that had constituted crisis proportions
prior to the split in only five years. The situation has reached emergency proportions in both circuits.
The Eleventh Circuit has petitioned Congress to refrain from adding more circuit judgeships in order
to preserve collegiality. Baker, supra note 2, at 70-71.
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5. Icebox Circuit
Some commentators faced with the discussion above have concluded
that the Ninth Circuit defies splitting.78 California's size does seem to get
in the way. There is simply no way to divide the Ninth Circuit the same
way Congress divided the Fifth-roughly in half-and avoid either
splitting a state or creating a one-state circuit. In fact, the Ninth Circuit is
so large, even splitting a state does not really solve its "largeness"
problem; it just creates two future problems of the same type.
Suppose the goal is not to divide the Ninth Circuit in half, however.
Suppose the goal is to create from the morass of the Ninth Circuit at least
one sensible Twelfth Circuit of more than two contiguous states, with
growing room, bound together by common regional interests and similar
outlooks, but not too homogeneous. In other words, suppose the goal is
not to solve the entire "problem," but to minimize it, to isolate it, to
maximize the number of citizens for whom it will be a solution, without
worrying if it is not a solution for all, or even most, people in the circuit.
Suppose the goal is to design a circuit as if one was designing it from
scratch.
If that is the goal, the solution is simple. It is the "Icebox Circuit:"
Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington,7 9 a contiguous bloc
slightly less than one-fourth the size of the current Ninth Circuit based on
filings and population."0 The rest of the old Ninth Circuit, including
Arizona, Hawaii, Nevada, and the territories, would not be so dominated
by California as to be a virtual single-state circuit.8 Arguably that area is
also a regional bloc, which the Commission on Structural Alternatives
78. Actually, some are more artful. Professor Carl Tobias has written that "[m]y effort to identify
a practicable realignment indicates that the court resists workable bifurcation." Tobias, supra note
41, at 601 (emphasis added). Bifurcation is not the same as splitting a circuit, because bifurcation
implies dividing the circuit into two fairly equal parts. I agree with Professor Tobias that bifurcating
the Ninth Circuit probably creates more problems than it solves in our present mindsets concerning
circuit structure and size. There is no reason, however, that we must divide the Ninth Circuit in half,
or only into two parts. One of the merits of the icebox split is that it creates at least one sensible
circuit while leaving a second circuit large enough to be sensibly split again at the appropriate time
in the future. Professor Tobias makes circuit splitting sound much harder than it really is.
79. Some believe Hawaii should be part of this circuit as well. That might actually be a good idea;
any circuit with Alaska and or Hawaii is going to be a large one geographically, so there is an
argument for keeping that problem isolated to one circuit.
80. O'Scannlain, supra note 59, at 321. Arguably Montana is slightly outside that bloc, but
nothing in life is ever perfect
81. These states would make up slightly more than one-fifth of the circuit's total workload. See
O'Scannlain, supra note 59, at 321.
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implicitly recognized when it sequestered the icebox states into its
proposed "Northern Division" of the Ninth Circuit.82
The remaining Ninth would still dwarf all the other circuits; thus, the
proposal is only a partial solution to the size problem. Instead of creating
two large circuits, the icebox split would create one slightly small
circuit, 3 and one that remains quite large. The "new Ninth" would have a
workload per remaining judge so large that it probably could not function
without at least a few new judges.' This does not necessarily mean that
the "new Ninth" would quickly begin to take on the problems of the old
Ninth, however. A new Ninth Circuit appropriately staffed with
approximately eighteen judges in three or four states would more closely
resemble the current Fifth Circuit with its seventeen active judges in
three states, than the old Ninth with twenty-eight authorized judges,
sixteen seniors, and eleven states plus two territories. The icebox split
would be a meaningful split even if the new Ninth remained the
country's largest circuit.
Further, the icebox split would not close the door on another future
stopgap solution. If the Hruska proposal removed the taboo from
splitting a state between two circuits, "the rest of the problem" might be
solved quite quickly if the requisite political support developed for even
more splitting, either in combination with a more general circuit
realignment or not. The Commission on Structural Alternatives
essentially endorsed this approach within the confines of the
administration of the current circuit, and its recommendations may
S2. Tentative Draft Report, supra note 9, at 39.
83. If the Icebox Circuit received no more judges, it would have eight actives, including the two
recent Clinton appointees. That would be two more than the First Circuit, the only circuit with a
single-digit complement of judges. The Hruska Commission specifically rejected this configuration
in its first report, but circumstances have changed. Hruska Report , supra note 40, at 242. The
icebox states included only 17% of the total Ninth Circuit filings in 1974. Id. The proportion is
approximately 23% now, which is a significant change. Id.; O'Scannlain, supra note 59, at 321. The
Hruska Commission specifically noted that if the filings from the icebox states significantly
increased, a separate circuit would be appropriate. Hruska Report 1, supra note 40, at 242. Moreover,
if the icebox configuration were modified to include Hawaii, the court would arguably be entitled to
nine active judges, making it significantly larger than the First Circuit.
84. O'Scannlain, supra note 59, at 321; see also Carlsen, supra note 26 (indicating that half of
circuit's judges are located in California.) Since Carlsen's article appeared, Congress has confirmed
four new Ninth Circuit judges, three of whom are not located in California. The four are evenly split
between the icebox states and the rest of the circuit. These new additions mean fewer than half are
located in California. The new Ninth would have 14 active judges, but this number is probably
insufficient to manage the caseload that remains as the number of filings per judge is larger in what
would be the new Ninth than in the new Twelfth.
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remove the stigma from splitting California." The "new Ninth" resulting
from the icebox split could be further split, either at the time of the initial
split or later. For example, the central and southerndistricts of California
(constituting thirty-four percent of the current Ninth's filings) could be
placed into one circuit, and Guam, Hawaii, the Northern Marianas, the
northern district of California, the eastern district of California, Nevada,
and Arizona (constituting forty-three percent of the current Ninth's
filings) could be placed into another.86
Obviously, this second split is more complicated, raising the state
division problem suggested by the Hruska split and the single-state and
federalism problems of the stringbean and horsecollar splits,87 but one
does not need to back this second split to back the icebox split. Putting
another state, such as Nevada, with the two lone California districts
might help, but that would create two circuits with fewer than three
states, another stumbling block, according to the first Hruska Report.
Perhaps the solution to the size problem of the new Ninth Circuit
would lie in the current Tenth, by moving one of its states into one of the
two circuits created by the second split or vice-versa."0 The Commission
discussed the merits of possibly moving Arizona into the Tenth Circuit;
it did not recommend such action because Arizona follows California
law in a number of areas and has many economic and geographical ties
to its western neighbor.89 This bit-by-bit approach to realignment would
not be quite as disruptive as completely redrawing circuit boundaries.
Because the icebox states also produce fewer filings per judge than what
would be the new Ninth Circuit,9" a few more judges for the new Ninth
would have to be thrown into the mix to keep the southern judges from
85. Tentative Draft Report, supra note 9, at 39.
86. See O'Scannlain, supra note 59, at 320. I should note that Judge O'Scannlain has not
endorsed this approach. Aside from whatever his opinion of the proposal's merits may be, it is
probably indelicate for him to endorse any plan that would facilitate creation of the Icebox Twelfth
Circuit, as he would be the Chief Judge of such a circuit if it is created soon because he is the most
senior active judge under age 65 who has not previously served as a chiefjudge. See 28 U.S.C. § 45
(1994).
87. See supra Parts U.B. 1-2.
88. Compared to the other regional circuits, the Tenth Circuit is overstaffed with judges. See
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business 108-11 (1997) (listing number of filings
in each circuit for 12 month period ending Sept. 30, 1997).
89. Tentative Draft Report, supra note 9, at 39, 48-49.
90. See supra note 84.
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being deluged with work, as discussed above.9' Obviously no such
"second split" should be attempted without further study. In fact, creating
a Twelfth Circuit out of the icebox states, but then instituting the division
format the Commission on Structural Alternatives recommends for the
new Ninth Circuit would be an attractive reform. Although the Icebox
Circuit alone is not a complete solution to the current Ninth's size
problem, the "new Ninth" would have a structure amenable to future
tinkering, and with a few more judges, could manage quite well without
the northwest. At least, we might be halfivay home!
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S REAL PROBLEMS JUSTIFY THE
ICEBOX SPLIT
The icebox split is a partial solution to the Ninth Circuit's size
problem that would leave an open door to a complete solution that would
not completely disrupt circuit boundaries. This assumes, however, that
the Ninth Circuit's size is, in fact, a problem. Academicians and others
interested in court administration have been fascinated over the past
twenty years since Congress opened the door to judicial innovation92 at
how creative the Ninth Circuit has been in adapting to the challenges of
its extensive land area, large collection of judges, and daunting
caseload.93 My first-hand observations of the Ninth Circuit reveal that the
Circuit does have some size-related problems that splitting the circuit
could mitigate. These problems include a busyness due to certain
categories of work, inconsistent and unpredictable circuit law, a strain on
collegiality, and geographical polarization.
A. The Icebox Split Would Decrease Workload
1. Big and Busy
One does not have to know much about the Ninth Circuit to realize
one thing: the Ninth Circuit is big. The Ninth Circuit contains more
states, covers more territory, boasts more judges, and dispenses justice to
91. It would no doubt be another sore point with northwestemers if they knew that their judges are
overworked so that they can help process California's appellate filings.
92. Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1633, 1633.
93. Their evaluations, that the Ninth Circuit is managing its magnitude well, are well documented
elsewhere. See, e.g., Meador, supra note 39, at 200-01. Most of the essays in this book are positive,
although some raise questions about whether the Ninth Circuit should remain as one unit.
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more people than any other circuit.94 If just one of its nine states were a
separate circuit, that state would be the third largest circuit in the
nation.95 The Ninth Circuit's population of forty-four million people is at
least twice as large as all but one other circuit.96 That's big.
The Ninth Circuit is also busy. Its 8,692 filings for the twelve month
period ending in September 1997 were over 1,000 more than in the next
largest circuit, the Fifth, but during much of that year the Ninth Circuit
had only one more active judge.97 The Ninth has become a model of what
can be done-through screening, delegation to staff, limited en banc
proceedings, memorandum dispositions, and submission on the briefs-
to maximize the efficient use of judicial resources.9 Academic
commentators find the Ninth Circuit's machinations to avoid drowning
in this workload fascinating.99 That's busy.
So the Ninth Circuit is big and busy. Is that bad?
It probably is. The Ninth Circuit may have led the way in
implementing efficiency mechanisms to help it manage its docket, but
the circuit's workload still makes it difficult for judges to lavish the
attention they might wish on their work.' 0 The primary cause is simply
that for some time the Ninth Circuit had been trying to do significantly
more work than the Fifth Circuit with virtually the same number of
active judges, and a few more Ninth Circuit confirmations have not
solved the problem.
Commentators on both sides of the split debate may have missed the
significance of the workload issue. Proponents of the circuit split often
cite the court's comparatively large size and high workload as an
argument in the split's favor.'' Critics point out the limits of that
argument: spreading the same number of filings over the same number of
94. See Baker, supra note 2, at 86-88.
95. Diarmuid O'Scannlain, A Ninth Circuit Split Is Inevitable, but Not Imminent, 56 Ohio St. L.J.
947, 949 (1995).
96. See Baker, supra note 2, at 87.
97. See Judicial Business, supra note 88. Further, the Fifth Circuit had many more prisoner
petitions than the Ninth, which tend to require less work than ordinary civil cases. Id. at 109-10.
98. In fact, one argument against splitting the circuit is that students ofjudicial administration will
lose their laboratory of judicial efficiency studies. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 41, at 594-95. They
need not fear-the Fifth Circuit and the new Ninth would soon fill the void.
99. See Meador, supra note 39.
100. See, e.g., Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal Courts: Too Few Judges, Too Many
Cases, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52.
101. See Bums, supra note 40, at 250-51; O'Scannlain, supra note 59, at 315.
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judges divided into two circuits still means the same number of judges
have to process the same number of cases."0 2 What is amazing, however,
is the number of well-informed court watchers who seem convinced that
splitting the circuit will have virtually no effect on workload.'13 These
observers do not completely appreciate the different types of work the
court does.
The work judges and their staffs do can be divided into two
categories: work in which volume depends on the number of filings per
judge and work in which volume depends on the total number of filings,
or put differently, the size of the circuit. Most of the workload dependent
on filings per judge arises directly or indirectly from garden-variety
filings, that is, appeals the judge will hear in a group of three judges
sitting either as a screening panel or a normal calendar panel. As long as
filings per judge remain the same, the size of the circuit in which they are
heard will not appreciably change the per judge workload they create."'4
Work whose volume depends on the size of the circuit arises from court
administration and efforts to maintain the consistency of the circuit's
law. The distinction between the two groups is subtle. Therefore, it is
worth considering exactly which tasks fall into each category.
2. Inside the "Sausage Factory' 105
Since going into private practice, I have learned from those who have
not spent time working for appellate courts that most lawyers have
almost no idea of what sorts of tasks appellate court judges actually do.
To remedy this information gap, imagine a Ninth Circuit judge's office.
He or she has three or four clerks, mostly recent law school graduates,
and either one or two secretaries. Judges generally sit on seven week-
long regular panels a year and two screening panels. Screening panels
resolve truly routine cases and motions, usually about 140 per week."'6
On regular panels, judges hear thirty to thirty-five cases of varying
complexity. Each judge's staff prepares bench memoranda on one-third
102. See Baker, supra note 2, at 90; Tobias, supra note 41, at 592.
103. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 2, at 89-90; Tobias, supra note 41, at 591-92.
104. This statement assumes that per capita filings per state do not vary significantly and do not
take certain other size related problems such as administration and collegiality into account.
105. J. Harvie Wilkinson Ill, The Drawbacks of Growth in the Federal Judiciary, 43 Emory L.J.
1147, 1170 (1994).
106. A judge on a screening panel may send a case to a regular panel on the theory that it cannot
be resolved in a matter of minutes.
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of the cases and distributes them to other judges on the panel. Judges will
read the cases and prepare for oral argument or for submission on the
briefs. They will occasionally exchange additional memoranda on the
cases prior to argument, and in a number of cases there are procedural
motions requiring orders or other attention from either judges or staff.
Many cases will be argued orally, then submitted for decision. After
submission, each judge will prepare either a published opinion or an
unpublished memorandum disposition in about a third of the cases,
usually the cases for which his office prepared the preliminary bench
memorandum. Most judges will dissent or concur separately in a handful
of cases. In between these legal activities, administrative and legal staff
will assign cases among clerks in the office, keep track of all the internal
memoranda and research, type dictation, do necessary research and
support tasks to help the judge prepare for cases for which his chambers
did not draft the bench memorandum, prepare the judge's calendar
materials so that they will be readily available on the bench, make sure
those materials are properly mailed and returned to the judge's home
chambers, make extensive travel arrangements, ensure that the judge's
visiting chambers is properly prepared for his use, and do innumerable
other tasks. These and other similar tasks are probably a full time job by
themselves.107
Assuming the number of judges in the current Ninth Circuit states
remains constant, most of the regular calendar and screening panel work
would remain no matter whether Congress splits the circuit or not.
Assuming also that the number of filings per capita is equal from state to
state (which is not quite the case), Congress could split the circuit and
divide the judges between circuits in proportion to population, and
workload per judge from these activities would not change. The work
load from other activities, however, could be reduced or eliminated.
3. Drowning in En Bancs
The amount of work associated with many judges' tasks depends on
the size of the circuit. Take en bane calls, for example. A case is
considered "en bane worthy" if it creates an inter- or intra-circuit split or
is a matter of particular importance,' but judges call for en bane
107. My observation is that it takes two to three full workdays for a trained clerk to produce the
average bench memorandum. If each chambers writes 10 bench memoranda, it will take 20 to 30
days of clerk time, and when I say "full" workdays, I am not referring to a mere eight-hour day.
108. See Fed. R. App. P. 35; 9th Cir. R. 35-1.
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rehearing and ultimately decide to hear cases en bane for many reasons,
including the simple fact that they disagree with the panel's decision."0 9
A bigger circuit is likely to produce more en bane calls than a small
circuit simply because it decides more cases.' Because each judge is
likely to make a few en bane calls a year regardless of the "worthiness"
of en bane according to the rules, the more judges, the more en bane
calls. Either way, a large circuit with many judges means many en bancs.
En bane calls add work for every judge in the circuit. In the current
Ninth Circuit, if a judge calls for en bane in a California case, all the
active judges from Washington also work up the case in order to decide
how to vote and in preparation for possible en bane panel service. The
opposite would be true if California and Washington were in different
circuits, which would mean less work for circuit judges in both states. If
Washington and California were in two different circuits and the number
of filings per judge remained the same, judges in the two states might
have the same panel workload per judge, but their caseloads would
include only a fraction of the en bane cases they currently manage.
Therefore, if it were possible to split the Ninth Circuit so that half the
filings went to one of the circuits and half the filings went to the other
circuit, one would expect the panel workload of each judge to remain the
same, but the en bane workload of each judge to decline by about fifty
percent. That would be a measurable change in workload. The question
is: How much of a change?
The decrease in workload that would result from fewer en bane cases
is greater than most observers realize. Professor Arthur Hellman, a split
critic and student of Ninth Circuit administration who questions the
usefulness of the en bane process in the Ninth Circuit, has done research
showing that only about one percent of the Ninth Circuit's published
opinions are reviewed in en bane rehearings."' It would be incorrect to
infer from that, however, that en bane calls do not constitute a significant
amount of the average judge's workload. Much more than one percent of
a judge's time is devoted merely to deciding whether to call for en bane
rehearing and whether the court should, in fact, rehear the case en bane.
109. Arthur D. Hellman, Maintaining Consistency in the Law of the Large Circuit, in
Restructuring Justice, supra note 39, at 55, 74-75.
110. Adding more judges would not change this. In fact, adding more judges might increase the
number of en bane calls per judge due to the consistency problems discussed infra Part I1.B.I. Also,
the greater number of judges making the occasional en bane call simply because the judge involved
disagrees vehemently with the outcome.
11. Hellman, supra note 109, at 74.
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By their very nature en banes are some of the most difficult cases,
requiring more research, more "tough calls," and therefore, more
precious judge time. My own informal observations lead me to think that
each judge and staff member devotes approximately ten hours a week to
en bane work."' This work includes deciding whether to call en bane,
drafting memoranda for and against going en bane, discussing en bane
cases in chambers, managing the mountain of e-mail en bane calls
produce, voting and maintaining voting records, reading and preparing
internal memoranda for the judge to use if chosen for the en bane panel,
traveling and hearing oral argument, recovering from that travel and
reorienting back to office work, preparing opinions after submission,
making suggestions and voting on opinions (over and over sometimes!),
and performing all the research and administrative work necessary to
support those activities. That is a significant investment in the en bane
process.
Maybe the problem is not the size of the circuit, say some critics.
Perhaps the whole en bane process is simply more trouble than it is
worth."'3 I doubt it. Only one or two percent of all opinions may provoke
an en bane call, but the specter of en bane haunts every panel."' Many
112. Everyone connected or formerly connected with the Ninth Circuit who hears this number
initially questions it. I find universal agreement that the investment in the en bane process is large,
but I hear two criticisms: (1) 10 hours is more time than clerks spend; and (2) clerks spend 10 hours
a week, but judges do not. Perhaps neither clerks nor judges realize how much time they spend on en
bane related matters. My view may be colored by the fact that I worked for a more junior judge, and
junior judges are more frequently assigned en bane opinions and therefore structurally have more
work to do on en bane projects. An important thing to remember is that everyjudge is different. It is
obvious that some judges, and therefore their staffs, participate more actively in the en bane
process-calling for en bane and circulating memos-than others. Occasionally a judge will become
deeply involved with an en bane project that consumes an immense amount of time, even though that
judge would not ordinarily put so much time into en bane work. Sitting on an en bane panel probably
consumes at least one day traveling and hearing argument, and another day preparing for the
argument. Upon hearing this, many who questioned 10 hours for judges find themselves agreeing
with it. Ten hours is an average for the court. Obviously, experiences will differ.
Adding judges can relieve some of the burden of sitting on en bane panels. My suspicion,
however, is that such relief is offset by additional judges who increase the number of en bane calls.
Technically there are rules about what cases are en bane worthy (matters of particular importance,
inter- and intra-circuit conflicts), but a significant number of en bane calls come from judges who
simply think the panel opinion is dead wrong. The larger the court's caseload, and/or the more
judges on the court, the more en bane calls there will be. More en bane calls increase workload to
some degree, regardless of the number ofjudges on the court available to sit on en bane panels.
113. See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 109, at 74.
114. See id. at 74, 77-78 (discussing this alternate view that is more consistent with my
observations).
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judges consider "stop clocks,""' 5 a means by which an off-panel judge
can pressure for changes in an opinion without invoking the formal en
bane process, and en bane calls themselves, quite embarrassing when
their work is the target. Judges self-edit and within panels they edit each
other to avoid "unnecessary" en bane calls. Opinions that "go too far,"
are frequently tempered long before they see print by intrapanel work or
discussion with off-panel judges. Defending against an en bane call is
enough work to provide a strong incentive for judges to remove
provocative dicta and other en bane "flags." In sum, the en bane process
is something of an interpersonal stick to keep otherwise quite
unconstrained judges in line."6 Therefore, the importance of the en bane
process in maintaining consistent law, and also in getting to the correct
result and producing the most useful precedent, goes far beyond the
number of times it is specifically invoked.
Of course, the simple fact that the Ninth Circuit hears so many cases
means that it hears proportionally more hard cases that will interest the
entire court." 7 That means that the absolute number of complex, en-
banc-worthy cases each judge must consider is greater, increasing
proportionally the amount of this type of work Ninth Circuit judges do
compared to judges in smaller circuits. Ninth Circuit Judge Jerome Farris
has further argued that the number of tough cases the Ninth Circuit
decides each year explains the court's high reversal rate."' That
115. "Stopping the clock" is a way that an off-panel judge asks the panel to give him or her more
time to consider calling for en banc rehearing. See id. at 71. Usually a memorandum requesting a
stop clock is accompanied by suggestions for changing the opinion-perhaps even its outcome. Id. at
71-72. Making such changes will eliminate the need off-panel judge sees for en banc rehearing. Id.
116. After all, if a judge has already decided to buck stare decisis or throw in some questionable
dicta, that judge has clearly not been constrained by the normal jurisprudential means. There are so
many ways to distinguish precedent without running afoul of stare decisis. Professor Hellman
suggests that it is "ludicrous" to think that the specter of en banc could cause a life-tenured judge to
decide a case in a different way from the one his own reading of the law demands. Id. at 77. This is
not consistent with my observation of judges at work. A judge is not deaf to reason; she may
conclude her reading of the law is wrong or would benefit from fuller development. Appellate judges
may not be overly concered about job security, but they do value the high opinion of their peers.
Some judges, such as Judge Stephen Reinhardt, feel they can best maintain their integrity and the
respect of others they value by taking on higher authorities. David M. O'Brien, Reinhardt and the
Supreme Court: This Time, It's Personal, L.A. Times, Dec. 15, 1996, at M2. Judge Reinhardt's
approach, however, is not representative of Ninth Circuit judges on this point, in my view.
117. See Jerome Farris, The Ninth Circuit-Most Maligned Circuit in the County-Fact or
Fiction?, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 1465, 1470-71 (1997).
118. Id.
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explanation seems improbable," 9 but the large number of tough cases
might explain why Ninth Circuit judges feel overworked. Judges in two
smaller circuits would not face so many such cases. 20
A related task whose length depends on the size of the circuit is
reviewing slip opinions and attorney-filed suggestions for rehearing en
banc."2 The court issues slip opinions prior to publication in the Federal
Reporters that arrive every day in judges' chambers. Both judges and
clerks review slip opinions and the briefs many losing litigants file
requesting en banc rehearing of a panel decision. Reviewing slip
opinions and requests for en banc rehearing has three purposes: helping
judges and clerks keep up with the law of the circuit, screening opinions
in order to make extra-panel suggestions for changes, and identifying
possible en banc calls. These contribute to the consistency and quality of
the circuit's law. Dividing the same number of slip opinions and requests
into two circuits will decrease the individual workload for all, because
119. For example, the Ninth Circuit was equally large in the late 1980s and early '90s, but the
reversal rate declined considerably then. See Carlsen, supra note 26.
120. One fair criticism of this discussion is that on a smaller court, judges would have to sit on a
greater percentage of en bane panels. That would increase workload. I suspect, however, that sitting
on a greater percentage of en bane panels is a minor offset to the considerable gains to be had from
decreasing the size of the circuit and therefore cutting the number of en bancs to be heard for two
reasons. First, very few cases are actually heard en bane, but many suggestions for rehearing en bane
are made by the parties, many stop-clocks are requested, and many en bane calls are made and
debated. Those burdens are substantially greater on a large circuit. Second, I suspect it is true that a
certain number of en bane calls are made by each judge; adding judges increases en bane calls, even
if the number of en bane worthy cases does not increase.
121. Ninth Circuit judges can, and do, limit the amount of "new law" in the circuit by writing as
many unpublished memorandum dispositions as possible. This is just another example of trying to
keep the lid on the workload problem, however. Some dispositions simply must be published, and it
would be a dereliction ofjudicial duty to do otherwise. The Ninth Circuit's rules require publication
only if it:
(a) Establishes, alters, modifies or clarifies a rule of law, or
(b) Calls attention to a rule of law which appears to have been generally overlooked, or
(c) Criticizes existing law, or
(d) Involves a legal or factual issue of unique interest or substantial public importance, or
(e) Is a disposition of a case in which there is a published opinion by a lower court or
administrative agency, unless the panel determines that publication is unnecessary for
clarifying the panel's disposition of the case, or
(f) Is a disposition of a case following a reversal or remand by the United States Supreme Court,
or
(g) Is accompanied by a separate concurring or dissenting expression, and the author of such
separate expression requests publication of the disposition of the Court and the separate
expression.
9th Cir. R. 36-2.
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each judge will only have to read a fraction of the opinions he read
before.' Greater familiarity with the most up-to-date twists and turns in
circuit law might also eliminate some en bane calls and facilitate the
research process on routine cases. 23
Anyway, suppose reviewing suggestions for en banc rehearing and
slip opinions takes judges and clerks three to five hours a week each. 24
Add to that at least five more hours preparing death penalty cases... and
you will see that as many as twenty hours a week are spent on tasks made
more time-consuming because the Ninth is a large circuit. If the Ninth
Circuit were divided in half, that twenty hours might become ten.
Ten hours makes a huge difference when a chambers is already
choked by its large caseload. Imagine adding a very full day to an
already overloaded week. Ten hours, week in and week out, is enough to
encourage even the best of judges to implement dubious efficiency
mechanisms such as relying uncritically on bench memoranda, allowing
122. See generally Gerald Bard Toflat, More Judges, Less Justice, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 70, 72
(discussing judicial workload in larger circuits).
123. See O'Scannlain, supra note 95, at 948. This benefit is more meaningful to judges than
clerks, because most clerks do not stay around long enough to benefit from institutional knowledge
and awareness. On the other hand, if a judge organizes his office so that he reviews cases and gives
instructions to clerks based on his own intuitive feel for the case, a solid sense of the broad outline of
circuit law can save everyone a great deal of time and effort But see Meador, supra note 39, at 197
(stating that Ninth Circuit may prove wrong rule of thumb that appellate court is too large if its
judges cannot read all of circuit's opinions).
124. This is not nearly enough time to read all the opinions, but it does permit an intense "flip-
through." According to Chief Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, it
can easily take an hour each day for judges on his much smaller court to read slip opinions.
Wilkinson, supra note 105, at 1177. A former Ninth Circuit Judge, Justice Anthony Kennedy said
that as early as 1978 he could no longer find the time to read all the Ninth Circuit's published
dispositions. Letterfrom Justice Anthony Kennedy, supra note 34, at 2.
125. It is clear that some judges lavish care on all death penalty cases (probably on the assumption
that, if no one else does so, that judge will make an en bane call as a matter of course), increasing the
workload their chambers face as a result; therefore, an estimate of an average is difficult to make.
This is not to say that some judges do not care about death penalties. All judges take them seriously,
but many only work up the cases where they are assigned either to the three-judge or en bane panel.
Because many en bane proceedings in collateral (habeas corpus) death penalty cases occur under
immense time pressure right before an execution, this is the one situation in which judges learn who
will sit on the en bane panel in advance of the en bane call. 9th Cir. P, 22-3(b). As a result, the
judges may be able to spend weeks or even months poring over briefs and the record prior to voting.
Often the one copy of the record is passed from judge to judge as the execution date approaches.
Even these efforts do not completely succeed in making the death penalty process run smoothly. See
Stephen Reinhardt, The Supreme Court, the Death Penalty, and the Harris Case, 102 Yale L.J. 205,
216-18 (1992-93); Alex Kozinski, Tinkering with Death, New Yorker, Feb. 10, 1997, at 48, 48.
Many death penalty cases provoke court-wide discussion and debate long before decisions come
down or certain relevant filings are made.
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clerks not only to draft decisions but to draft decisions that are merely
warmed-over bench memoranda,126 declining to participate actively in the
en banc process, and submitting too many cases on the briefs. Ten hours
can be the difference between trying to do good work and trying to
survive. If we structure our appellate courts so that that judges' and
staffs' mere survival constitutes heroism, then we do not deserve justice.
It does not matter much whether I have over or underestimated a little
in concluding that every Ninth Circuit judge and clerk could save ten
hours a week if the circuit were split in half. If I have underestimated, the
problem is even more alarming; if I have overestimated, the point
remains that the split will decrease workload enough to be worth
considering. It does not matter if one of the two new circuits ends up
with more filings per judge than the other; a couple of additional judges
on the busier circuit can solve that problem, and should then be part of
any split package. Further, since the Icebox Circuit would be particularly
small, time savings of the type described above would be a bonanza for
its judges because they could be expected to save more than half of the
time currently spent on these types of tasks. It is simply not true that a
circuit split would make no difference to the circuit's "real" problem:
workload.
126. More frequently than is comfortable, one finds Ninth Circuit opinions (as opposed to
unpublished memorandum dispositions) that are obviously warmed-over bench memoranda. Not all
judges do this-some write all their own opinions-but that decision involves a tradeoff. The
workload is sufficiently large that comers must be cut somewhere, and judges who write all their
own work may have a hard time keeping their dockets current.
Opinions that law clerks write have several disadvantages. Aside from the obvious fact that clerks
are not appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, and therefore should not be writing
law for the nation, what clerk-written opinions mean for precedential value and stare decisis in the
long run I cannot imagine. As Chief Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
has explained, "The more apparent that an opinion is the work of the law clerk, the less attention
judges and lawyers will pay to the broad holding. This will reduce the authority of judicial decisions
as sources of legal guidance and will increase uncertainty and with it litigation." Richard A. Posner,
The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform 149 (1996). Per curium decisions, written by staff
attorneys and signed by the judges, are not taken as seriously as opinions obviously authored by a
particular judge. Is a clerk-written opinion equally persuasive as one that is obviously judge-written?
It is certainly easy to tell the difference. Id. at 145-57. Clerk-written opinions necessarily lack the
confidence and frequently the gravitas of judge-written work. Clerk-written work often attempts to
reason backwards to a proposition by eliminating all other possible results, while judge-written work
starts by directly establishing the veracity of the proposition at hand. Chief Judge Posner has also
noted that opinions law clerks write have an almost ostentatious reliance on footnotes, secondary
sources, and other hallmarks of legal scholarship. Id. at 148.
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4. An Hour Here, an Hour There
The split could save everyone some time in other little ways. For
example, the Ninth Circuit has too many judges and too many panels
hearing cases in too many places and at too many times ever to hold a
court meeting while the judges are all on calendar in the same city. This
is very wasteful; it means all the judges have to make additional trips for
court meetings several times a year. A smaller circuit, such as one made
up of the northwestern states, could save that time because all the judges
could sit on different panels, in the same city, at the same time, and hold
the meeting there and then. Two geographically smaller circuits would
also decrease judges' travel time to get to their panel calendars and en
bane hearings.'27 That may not be meaningful to the army of judges from
the Los Angeles area who either walk down the hall, drive across town,
or grab a airline shuttle to get to their hearings, but it makes a great deal
of difference to judges coming from Fairbanks, Billings, and Boise.'
Individually, these and other changes might not make much of a
difference in an average week-an hour or so-but an hour here, an hour
there. . why, all of a sudden you are talking about real time!
5. Diminishing Marginal Returns from More Manpower
Further, general management theory teaches that as organizations
increase in size, the administrative burden increases geometrically,'29 and
there is no reason to think a court should be different in this regard from
any other organization. According to Peter Drucker, "[t]he larger any
body, physical or social, becomes, the more of its energy will be needed
127. Joint Statement of Stephen S. Trott & Thomas G. Nelson to the Commission on Structural
Alternativesfor the Federal Courts ofAppeals 7 (May 27, 1998) (visited Sept. 24, 1998) <http://app.
comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/submitted/pdf/nelson.pdf>.
128. It actually makes a big difference to Los Angeles judges as well. If a judge on calendar is
sitting in a city not her own, she not only loses the travel time to get there, but she faces the
inefficiencies of working out of an office that is not her own and the irritations (and time killers) of
living out of a suitcase. Judges from everywhere except Los Angeles and San Francisco face this for
most if not all of their calendars. The plurality of judges are from Los Angeles, however, and they
would be a majority in a new Ninth Circuit. These judges might travel only rarely in a new circuit
although they frequently travel to San Francisco and Seattle in the current Ninth.
129. Peter F. Drucker, Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices 639-40 (1974); see also
C.E. Ferguson, Microeconomic Theory 188-89 (1966). Problems of management coordination and
control, which are likely to develop in large organizations, create diseconomies of scale. Paul G.
Keat & Philip K.Y. Young, Managerial Economics: Economic Tools for Today's Decision Makers
330 (2d ed. 1996).
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to keep the 'inside,' that is, its own mechanisms, alive and
functioning."' 30 Size determines the complexity of an organization, but
complexity feeds size. 3' It is a vicious circle. Professors Harold Koontz
and Heinz Weihrich put it in practical terms: "[t]he larger the
organization, the more decisions to be made, and the more places in
which they must be made, the more difficult it is to coordinate them."' 32
This is precisely the phenomenon Justice Charles Evans Hughes
described when confronted with President Franklin Roosevelt's court-
packing plan: "[t]here would be more judges to hear, more judges to
confer, more judges to discuss, more judges to be convinced and to
decide."'33 Even judges on circuit courts, where only three judges decide
each case, have noted similar problems of scale.'34
Staff can help, but "more staff" is not necessarily the answer.'35
Additional staff will produce diminishing marginal returns because more
staff requires even more staff to administer them. Judges, however, will
always have to carry a good bit of the administrative burden and the
administrative burden on the Ninth Circuit judges is bigger than on
judges in other Circuits because the Ninth Circuit is bigger than other
circuits. The Chief Judge's job is bigger because the circuit is bigger.
The en bane coordinator's job is bigger because the circuit is bigger-
there are more en bancs and more judges to speak on each case.'36 The
death penalty coordinator's job is bigger because the circuit is bigger-
there are more death penalty cases and more judges to coordinate. The
judge's conference organizer's job is bigger, because the conference has
to be done on such a grand scale. The law clerk orientation chair's job is
bigger for the same reason. Staff can help considerably, but judges quite
properly do a significant amount of the work. Again, the size of the
Ninth Circuit has increased workload per judge. Filings per judge are just
part of the story.
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, formerly a combined Fifth Circuit,
are examples of an interesting phenomenon worthy of careful academic
130. Drucker, supra note 129, at 639.
131. Id.
132. Harold Koontz & Heinz Weihrich, Management 226 (9th ed. 1988).
133. Tjoflat, supra note 122, at 71 (quoting Justice Charles Evans Hughes).
134. Id.; see also infra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
135. As will be discussed later, use of staff is a double-edged sword. See infra Part III.C.6.
136. Although en bane courts have only eleven members, all judges participate in the process of
deciding whether to take the case to en bane rehearing.
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attention. Before Congress split the Fifth Circuit, it resolved 4,717
appeals per year. In 1995, the two halves of the old Fifth, the new Fifth
and the new Eleventh Circuit, resolved 12,401 appeals with only three
more judges than the old Fifth. Nevertheless, judges on both courts are
resisting additions to their ranks, while Ninth Circuit judges are begging
senators to confirm nominees. a7 Part of the reason the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits have absorbed such a huge caseload increase with essentially the
same number of judges, according to the Eleventh Circuit's Chief Judge
Gerald Bard Tjoflat, is that two smaller courts are more collegial than
one big court, and collegiality saves time.38 Smaller courts are more
efficient than one large court because the judges know each other and get
along better, greasing the wheels of productivity as they go. For the same
reasons, there may be limits to the Ninth Circuit's economies of scale. In
most institutions, the marginal utility of more manpower does eventually
become negative.'39 Judge Tjoflat's personal experience confirms that the
same thing can happen on courts. Given that the Ninth Circuit's caseload
is not declining, maybe it should try some of the Fifth Circuit's medicine.
B. The Icebox Split Would Improve Consistency and Predictability
in the Law
1. Consistency: Limited En Banc or Expanded Panel?
When the Fifth Circuit's workload spiraled out of control in the late
1970s due to increased population and a bloated civil rights docket,
Congress first tried to solve the problem by adding more judges. 4 Two
years later, the Fifth Circuit's twenty-six active judges begged Congress
to divide the circuit. 4' Maintaining uniformity of the circuit's law was a
primary motivation: there were simply too many panels and twenty-six
judge en banc courts were too unwieldy in operation to keep the law of
the circuit under control. 4
2
137. Baker, supra note 2, at 70-71. In fact, the court has requested 10 additional judges, for a
total of 38. O'Scannlain, supra note 59, at 315.
138. Tjoflat, supra note 122, at 70.
139. See, e.g., Keat & Young, supra note 129, at 330.
140. See Baker, supra note 2, at 62-68.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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Chief Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat, who served on both the old Fifth and
the new Eleventh, described the problem to Professor Thomas Baker in
terms that make it sound inevitable in large circuits:
The more judges we create at the appellate level, the larger we
make courts of appeals, the more unstable the law becomes. If you
have three judges on a court of appeals, the law is stable. It is stable
for litigants, lawyers, and district judges. The outcome of a suit,
should one be filed, is predictable. When you add the fourth judge
to that court, you add some instability to the rule of law in that
circuit because another point of view is added to the decision
making. When you add the fifth judge, the sixth judge, when you
get as large as the old Fifth Circuit was, with twenty-six judges, the
law becomes extremely unstable. One of several thousand different
panel combinations will decide the case, will interpret the law.
Even if the court has a rule, as we did in the old Fifth, that one
panel cannot overrule another, a court of twenty-six will still
produce irreconcilable statements of the law. 43
In other words, the more judges, the more panel combinations; the more
panel combinations, the greater likelihood that any two panels will
produce irreconcilable interpretations of the law."
The Ninth Circuit has that very problem. Survey data indicate that
consistency is not viewed as a hallmark of the court's work.'45 The Ninth
Circuit's consistency problem has two twists, however. First, with
twenty-two active judges, but filings that would justify twenty-eight, the
Ninth Circuit relies heavily on senior and visiting judges, bringing that
many more of Judge Tjoflat's "point[s] of view" into the mix.'46 Second,
143. Id. at 66-67 (quoting from interview with Gerald Bard Tjoflat).
144. See Wilkinson, supra note 105, at 1176.
145. Meador, supra note 39, at 196. Surveys do come out on both sides, see Baker, supra note 2,
at 92; but, they indicate a disturbing amount of dissatisfaction with the court's consistency.
146. Many Ninth Circuit senior judges are as well known to the Ninth Circuit bar as active judges,
but visiting seniors and district judges are not. Those judges may only sit with the circuit once or
twice a year, which means it may take between five and ten visiting judges to make up the calendar
work of an active judge (a visiting judge under the rules cannot do the court's en banc or death
penalty work). Therefore, the court may need as many as five or ten more "points of view" to make
up for the one point of view lost due to the lack of an active judge.
By the way, frequent use of visiting and even senior judges also-you guessed it-increases
workload! Visiting judges are anxious to learn and were able to catch on quickly to many of the
arcane procedural rules and informal practices of our court (the way memorandum dispositions are
written, the protocol of letting writing judges vote first on petitions for rehearing, etc.) that had taken
me much of the year to figure out. Nevertheless, active judges' chambers spend considerable time
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the Ninth Circuit does not resolve inconsistencies by bringing all the
points of view together in the en banc process. 4 The former Fifth
Circuit found during its twenty-six active judge days that en banc
consideration was not much of a solution to consistency problems
because of the administrative complexities of convening such a large
court-where is there a room big enough?-and the difficulty of getting
opinions drafted. These were the primary reasons the Fifth Circuit judges
ultimately asked Congress to split the circuit after first trying to make a
go of it as a twenty-six judge court.'48 The Ninth Circuit relies instead on
a "limited en bane" court of only eleven judges.'49 This solution for a
(too) large court is only a partial one, however. A limited en banc court is
easier than a full en banc court to convene when inconsistencies in the
law arise, but it adds potential instability because it does not bring
together all the points of view on the court.
Happily for workload concerns, although not necessarily for
outcomes, 5 ° the Ninth Circuit has so far resisted calls for full court en
educating the visiting chambers to help them get up to speed. Active judges are also hesitant to allow
visiting judges to write the most controversial opinions, feeling, quite properly, that if there are to be
major changes or developments in the law of the circuit, a Ninth Circuit judge should make that
statement That just means, however, that the clerks of active Ninth Circuit judges get all the hard
bench memoranda and the active Ninth Circuit judges have to write all the hard opinions, with all the
implications for workload that implies. There is no rule on this, of course, but it is pretty clear that
this is how opinions get assigned. Many non-active judges are not supposed to participate in the en
bane process. See 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1994). Thus, the active judges on the panel are left with the
responsibility of defending the panel's work later on.
147. The Ninth Circuit uses only a "limited" en banc process, which, of course, is no en banc
process at all. See 9th Cir. R. 35-3.
148. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text; Baker, supra note 2, at 62-64.
149. 9th Cir. R. 35-3 states "The en banc court, for each case or group of related cases taken en
banc, shall consist of the Chief Judge of this circuit and 10 additional judges to be drawn by lot from
the active judges of the Court." Congress authorized limited en banc courts in 1978, but the Ninth
Circuit is the only court to take Congress up on the offer. See Hellman, supra note 11l, at 62-70.
150. Bear in mind that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in three Ninth Circuit en banc cases
in the October 1996 term and reversed them all. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997); Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. 43 (1997); California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2 (1996). It
implicitly overruled at least one more, United States v. Keys, 95 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 1996), in Johnson
v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997). There are limits to how far this data can be taken. Aside from
the fact that four cases are probably not statistically significant, one still might argue that this
record is a serious indictment of the en banc process-especially since in at least two of those
cases the panel "got it right" in the first place. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d
586 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Vashington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); United
States v. Keys, 67 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 1816 (1997). Further, these were
all tough cases, on which even the most finely tuned legal minds could differ. See Farris, supra
note 117, at 1469-70. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit's reversal rate is by leaps and bounds the
worst in the nation. Id. at 1465.
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banc.' As long as the Ninth Circuit remains understaffed with only
twenty-two judges, an eleven-judge court is at least half of the total,
although not the more attractive majority. If Congress appoints more
judges,152 however, the Ninth Circuit's current procedure might
degenerate from being a limited en bane to a mere expanded panel.'53
This has disconcerting implications for the legitimacy of en bane
proceeding, both to litigants and judges. Professor Hellman's research
indicates that the tiny group of cases actually decided by an en bane
panel may not be what either practitioners or academics think are most
important,'54 but what en banc opinions do provide is the rare
opportunity for the court to speak with something of an institutional
voice. The smaller the percentage of circuit judges on the en bane court,
the less accurate and compelling that voice becomes, and the more
difficult reading the court becomes.
2. An "Unknown " Bench: Problems of Predictability
Academic observers laud the Ninth Circuit's many administrative
reforms, such as the limited en bane, that enable the judges to process
their huge caseload and coordinate the efforts of so many."' One
disadvantage is that these reforms add an air of mystery to the court; they
make the result difficult to predict, because the process is hard to
understand.
The Ninth Circuit does not need more mystery; it already has
plenty.'56 Surveys and anecdotes are full of complaints that Ninth Circuit
panels considering similar issues often decide them differently and that
results are too hard to predict. As Karl Llewellyn explained in The
Common Law Tradition, lawyers' ability to predict the outcome of
appeals, and therefore to determine whether they should even bring them
151. The Ninth Circuit has apparently voted three times to consider full court en banc. See
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85 F.3d 1440 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); Campbell v. Wood, 20 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980).
152. Although the Senate apparently turned off the spigot of Ninth Circuit confirmations in 1996
and 1997, the confirmation process is moving again. See supra note 56.
153. Changes, such as full court or "fuller court" en banc might follow, adding to total workload.
154. See Hellman, supra note 111, at 76.
155. See Baker, supra note 2, at 78-83; Tobias, supra note 35, at 1363-64.
156. Paul D. Carrington, An Unknown Court: Appellate Caseload and the "Reckonability" of the
Law of the Circuit, in Restructuring Justice, supra note 39, at 206, 210.
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in the first place, has much to do with how well the lawyer knows the
court, its procedures, and the persons who will make the decision.'57 This
is the court's "reckonability."' 58 The Ninth Circuit is not very reckonable,
according to Professor Paul Carrington, because it has so many judges
and so many combinations of personalities and philosophies that it is
very difficult to "know" the court, or worse, the three-judge interaction
of personalities that will hear your case.'59 Uncertainty has the effect of
depressing the value of a case, which effectively robs claimants of their
full rights. 60 Professor Carrington has applied Karl Llewellyn's principle
of reckonability to the Ninth Circuit and has warned that the size of the
court may actually be increasing caseloads because it discourages
settlement.' 6' Two smaller courts would be more reckonable to their
respective bars than one large court.
3. Problems of Consistency and Predictability: Points of View and
"Outlier Panels "
On every court, there are a few judges with extreme or "outlier" points
of view. This can provide a healthy diversity to the court. There is
something irritatingly endearing about Judge Z who, for example, "just
does not believe in fee-shifting statutes," which adds a useful reminder
that there is more than one view on even fairly well-settled matters. Odds
are that on a small court only one or two of the judges have outlier views
in common, which means that while outlier judges may have the ability
to influence the tone of the law of the circuit, they rarely ever get much
of a chance to change it. Majority rules, tempered by civility to the
minority.
On a court as large as the Ninth Circuit, however, three or more
judges could be lumped together near one of the ends of the bell curve of
judicial philosophies, policy priorities, or political ideologies. Three or
more judges is sufficient to make up a panel or at least a majority in a
number of panels. The chance of being confronted with a panel "that
does not believe in fee-shifting statutes," or "who never met a handgun
157. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 18, 34-35 (1960).
158. Id.
159. Carrington, supra note 156, at 210. Knowing the panel is even more difficult, because panel
composition is not made public until only days prior to argument.
160. Tjoflat, supra note 122, at 72-73.
161. Carrington, supra note 156, at 210. But see Carrington, supra note 7, at 139.
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they didn't like," or (as is more often mentioned in connection with the
Ninth Circuit) is very liberal or very conservative, is therefore greater
than on a smaller court. Further, observation of the court suggests that on
some matters, the views of the judges are not shaped like a bell curve,
but are instead sharply polarized. 62
Outlier panels and polarization can cause significant problems with
consistency and predictability. If an issue has not been explored
previously or is very fact sensitive, lawyers may be unable to rely on
clues or general themes from opinions on other subjects to be sure any
particular panel.will decide the issue any particular way, making the
court difficult to predict. If a multiprecedent issue is involved, the panel
may simply choose one or the other of the available approaches and not
publish its opinion, as discussed below, creating both practical
consistency and predictability problems.'63 It is understandable why
lawyers trying to puzzle out the law of the circuit and conform their
arguments to it might grumble that "Las Vegas is the capital of the Ninth
Circuit.'
64
162. What appears as polarization on the Ninth Circuit would be an outlier judge on a smaller
court because the Ninth Circuit is so large. Polarization does not necessarily mean the Ninth Circuit
is split evenly on a matter. If six judges on the court think the invited error doctrine no longer exists
in the circuit, for example, they may make up only one-third of the circuit, but they can publish a lot
of opinions on the matter and control an en bane panel, although not many other circuits would
agree. Compare United States v. Perez, 116 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 1997) (en bane) (six judge majority
with five judges concurring), with United States v. Tandon, 111 F.3d 482, 487-89 (6th Cir. 1997),
United States v. Baiter, 91 F.3d 427, 434 (3d Cir. 1996), United States v. Mitchell, 85 F.3d 800 (lst
Cir. 1996), United States v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 912, 923-24 (7th Cir. 1996), and United States v.
Hardwell, 80 F.3d 1471, 1487 (10th Cir. 1996). The Perez en bane majority of merely six judges
held that invited error doctrine should be limited to situations where a party has intentionally
relinquished a known right to a different trial procedure or jury instruction, and therefore, plain error
review is available unless a party submits jury instructions knowing he would be entitled to other
instructions under the law. By contrast, the five-judge concurring opinion, along with the five
circuits cited above, the only circuits to have considered the issue, confirm that when a party
requests an instruction or a certain procedure, and that instruction or procedure turns out to be error,
review on appeal is unavailable whether the requesting party knew he was entitled to a different
instruction or not, because the requesting party invited the trial judge's error. Relevant to the
polarization issue, Perez demonstrates that with a limited en bane procedure, a mere one-third of the
Ninth Circuit can and does hand down en bane decisions that are national outliers. Two judges on a
panel may do the same thing, even for this twenty-two judge court. A third of a six-judge court, such
as the first circuit, could barely control a panel, but a third of an eighteen-judge court, or even a
twenty-eight-judge court with a limited en bane process, can control many panels and en banes.
163. Tjoflat, supra note 122, at 72.
164. Carrington, supra note 156, at 210. But see Baker, supra note 2, at 91-92. Professor
Hellman has done a useful study indicating that there are many fewer decisional inconsistencies than
all the carping from lawyers might suggest. See generally Hellman, supra note 109. The study has
several weaknesses, however. First, it analyzes only published work. Because at least 75% of the
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Worse, the size of the Ninth Circuit means that the idiosyncrasies of
individual judges are less likely to be mitigated by institutional
constraints. Ninth Circuit panels are not tempered by an institutional
voice, for example, because without a full court en banc at least setting a
tone, the institution itself never speaks.'65 Nor does even a significant
portion of the institution speak on a regular basis. On a six-judge court,
or even a ten-judge court, a three-judge panel is a significant part of the
court. Therefore, a significant part of the court speaks every time a panel
hands down a decision. On a twenty-two, or worse, a twenty-eight judge
court, an individual three-judge panel is hardly noticeable in the
cacophony-except, of course, to the litigants whose fates have been
determined by that panel.'66 Panels don't just have autonomy on the
Ninth Circuit; they are structurally prone to becoming independent
operators because of weak institutional constraints. 67 A pair of smaller
institutions could exert more control over their respective members
without changing a single internal procedure.
4. Workload Redux: Rolling the Dice on Appeal
These problems have a workload component also. Lack of consistency
and predictability in a circuit's law encourages appeals to take advantage
of the uncertainty. 6 ' Because there is a good chance of running into an
outlier panel or a panel reflective of one of the court's polarizations, even
lawyers with weak cases have a strong incentive to "roll the dice" on
court's decisions are unpublished, concentrating on only published work may hide the extent of the
consistency problem, despite the fact that unpublished decisions are often made on the "easiest"
cases, by allowing a panel to hide inconsistency. This would explain why the Ninth Circuit
appears relatively consistent in F.3d, but lawyers do not see it that way. The average attorney
trying to figure out not just what the law says, but also how his or her case will actually be
decided, is going to be paying attention to what the court does with unpublished dispositions.
Unfortunately, their results are all over the map. Second, due to the practical difficulties of
conducting such a study, Professor Hellman leaves out many of the classes of decisional
disharmony, such as conflicting dicta, which bear on the outcomes of future cases. One would
see much more decisional disharmony if one applied a less exacting standard for inconsistency
than Professor Hellman. Meador, supra note 39, at 200.
165. See Tjoflat, supra note 122, at 71.
166. Worse, there are very few three-judge panels of active judges, because so many Ninth Circuit
panels include at least one senior or visiting judge.
167. Judge Wilkinson states: "As the number of judges rolls ever upward, the law of the circuit
will become more nebulous and less distinct. Indeed, it is likely that the law of the circuit will be
replaced by the law of the panel." Wilkinson, supra note 105, at 1176.
168. Tjoflat, supra note 122, at 71; Wilkonson, supra note 105, at 1175.
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appeal and hope the random draw of panel judges comes out in their
favor. After all, the Ninth is a circuit of judges that Chief Justice William
Rehnquist once described as having "a hard time saying 'no' to any
litigant with a hardluck story., 169 As the award winning movie The
Shawshank Redemption pointed out, "hope is a good thing; maybe the
best of things," 7' but in real life, hope does little to control caseloads.
C. The Icebox Split Would Facilitate Collegiality
Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Procter Hug, Jr. recently told a
symposium at the University of Montana School of Law that even
during the period when the court grew from thirteen to twenty-eight
judges, he had "enjoyed some of the finest professional and collegial
relationships in [his] entire life."'' The Ninth Circuit has been
fortunate to have leadership at the top in the collegiality department,
particularly during Chief Judge Hug's tenure. Nevertheless, the Hruska
Commission predicted as early as the mid-1970s that maintaining
collegiality on large circuits would be a challenge.' Judge Tjoflat's
experience on the larger former Fifth Circuit suggests that the
Commission was right.' Both Chief Judge Wilkinson and Chief Judge
Harry T. Edwards have written that collegiality is probably an
inevitable casualty of jumbo circuits. 74 Ninth Circuit Judge Diarmuid
O'Scannlain has cited the risk to collegiality as an argument in favor of
a Ninth Circuit split.'75 Oral statements from judges are just one type of
evidence of interpersonal relationships between the judges, however.
Nevertheless, we need not eavesdrop on internal communications to
hear discord in the ranks because the judges have put quite enough of
their differences right in F.3d. 76
What follows are excerpts from opinions in extremely complicated
and highly controversial cases, each of which sent the Ninth Circuit into
an uproar. They are not examples of a lack of collegiality themselves, but
169. James B. Stewart, Judicial Mavericks: Ninth Circuit's Judges Frequently Run Afoul of the
Supreme Court, Wall St. J., Dec. 19, 1984, at Al.
170. The Shawshank Redemption (Castle Rock Entertainment 1994).
171. Hug, supra note 30, at 299.
172. Hruska I, supra note 40, at 57.
173. Tjoflat, supra note 122, at 70.
174. Id. (quoting Judge Harry T. Edwards); Wilkinson, supra note 105, at 1173.
175. See, e.g., O'Scannlain, supra note 95, at 948.
176. See infra Parts I.C. 1-.3.
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rather are tips of the iceberg: evidence of what the judges must think and
feel behind the scenes.' A full reservoir of collegial capital built up over
time will smooth over these rough periods, but the harshness in the Ninth
Circuit's recent opinions suggests that its reservoir may be running dry.
1. Adventures with Full Court En Banc: Compassion in Dying v.
Washington
Since adoption of the limited en banc option in 1978, the Ninth Circuit
has never voted for a full-court en banc hearing in any case.'78 The most
recent attempt was Compassion in Dying v. Washington, a case
concerning the constitutionality of a Washington law to ban assisted
suicide.'79 Compassion in Dying was an "event" for the Ninth Circuit. It
pushed the court to the procedural brink, and things understandably
became heated along the way.
The case was controversial from the beginning. The subject matter-
assisted suicide-is not just a current hot-button issue. In this case, it
forced a major constitutional showdown over whether there were
unenumerated fundamental rights not yet recognized and how one would
determine what they were. When the court announced the randomly
chosen three-judge panel that would hear the case, attorneys for the
groups opposing the ban complained that law would not decide the
matter because Judges John Noonan, Jr. and Diarmuid O'Scannlain,
well-known as Roman Catholics, were too biased to decide the case
fairly. "' Of course, the court did not change the panel, and Noonar. and
177. The mere fact that a judge uses strong language in an opinion is not necessarily wrong. Many
judges quick to jump into the fray are some of the most outstanding jurists in the country, and their
unwillingness to sugar-coat matters is evidence of their seriousness. On the other hand, strong
language also means that judges are being pushed very hard, and the institutional check of
collegiality is not functioning to hold them back at some crucial times. Things are being said
publicly that judges may find very difficult to forgive later, however justifiable. Ask yourself how
quickly you would recover from some of the rhetoric in Ninth Circuit opinions if it were directed at
work or views of which you were proud, in some cases by people you do not like very much, and
then ask yourself what the collegiality situation must be like. See Collins J. Seitz, Collegiality and
the Court ofAppeals, 75 Judicature, June-July 1991, at 27.
178. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85 F.3d 1440, 1441 (9th Cir. 1996), revd sub nom.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from decision not to
rehear case by full court en banc).
179. Id.
180. The appellants' legal case was based substantially on abortion rights cases. The appellees
noted that Judge Noonan has written numerous articles and books criticizing those cases. Not long
afterwards, Judge Noonan published a one-judge order in a different case explaining what should
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O'Scannlain did form the majority upholding the law.' As the Supreme
Court would point out later, their decision was correct under the law. 2
Nevertheless, the controversy over the panel's composition was not an
auspicious beginning for either the court or the legal issues in the case.
The court decided to rehear the case en bane, and some of the limited
en bane panel's criticisms had the unfortunate side effect of reinforcing
the appellees' criticisms of the three-judge panel. The en bane court
compared the panel unfavorably with the district court in its failure to be
sufficiently "dispassionate and traditional" in its analysis of the state's
interests in preventing assisted suicide.183 The three-judge panel felt the
assisted suicide ban was justifiable because it protected the poor and
minorities from possible exploitation; but, the en bane panel responded
that "[t]his rationale simply recycles one of the more disingenuous and
fallacious arguments raised in opposition to the legalization of abortion.
It is equally meretricious here."' 84 Another panel conclusion was termed
"ludicrous." ' The en bane opinion concluded that those opposing
physician-assisted suicide "are not free ... to force their views, their
religious convictions, or their philosophies on all the other members of a
democratic society."'86 As luck of the en bane panel draw would have it,
none of the three-judge panel members were on the en bane panel to
defend its decision or one another.'87
have been unnecessary in the 1990s-that Roman Catholic judges are competent to decide cases
about or related to abortion issues. Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Codispoti, 69 F.3d 399 (9th
Cir. 1995).
181. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1995), aff d en bane, 79
F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'dsub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
182. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258. In another twist of fate, Washington state actually had one of
its judges on the original three-judge panel, Eugene Wright, and he dissented from the panel's
decision. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 594.
183. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 817.
184. Id. at 825 (footnote omitted).
185. Id. The en bane Court concluded that it was "ludicrous on its face" that "disadvantaged
persons will receive more medical services than the remainder of the population in one, and only
one, area-assisted suicide." Id. The three-judge panel had reasoned that the State had a legitimate
interest in protecting minorities from exploitation by physicians who encourage them to take
advantage of assisted suicide to reduce the cost of public assistance. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d
at 592.
186. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 839.
187. Id. at793.
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Apparently a call for full court en bane was made but failed to attract
enough votes. 88 Judge O'Scannlain's dissent from this decision hit back
hard against the en bane panel's reasoning that had excoriated his own.
89
He stated that Planned Parenthood v. Casey'"9 was "a perniciously thin
reed upon which to rest the majority's radical holding;"'9' "the majority
draws an absurd parallel" in comparing assisted suicide with abortion;92
and the en bane panel's holding was "nothing short of pure invention-
constitutionally untenable and historically unprecedented."'
93
Compassion in Dying was an extremely important case with grave
consequences. Understandably, the judges cared a great deal about the
outcome,' 94 and it was no wonder tempers flared a little. Compassion in
Dying is not notable for uncollegial rhetoric; however, it is notable
because the strong language in it is commonplace.
2. Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson: A Lecture on Stare
Decisis
Almost everything about the panel's work on the groundbreaking
affirmative action case, Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, was
remarkable. 95 Coalition raised the issue of whether a recent California
constitutional amendment, passed by initiative (Proposition 209), which
prohibited public race and gender preferences, was consistent with the
federal constitution.' Again, "luck of the draw" produced an amusing
twist that must confirm that Ninth Circuit panels are randomly chosen.
No one worried about public relations or political correctness on the
court would have chosen this panel: Republican-appointed judges
Diarmuid O'Scannlain, Edward Leavy, and Andrew J. Kleinfeld, none of
188. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85 F.3d 1440 & n.71 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct 2258 (1997).
189. Id. Judge John Noonan wrote the panel opinion and Judge O'Scannlain joined it.
Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 592.
190. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
191. Compassion in Dying, 85 F.3d at 1443-44 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 1444.
193. Id. at 1446.
194. For example, the en banc majority devoted almost 50 pages to the decision, and dissents
added 20 more. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc),
rev'dsub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
195. 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997).
196. Id. at711.
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whom are from California, the state where the law under attack in the
case originated. Further, the panel first encountered jurisdiction of the
case while sitting as a screening panel when the district court refused to
stay a preliminary injunction barring application of the provision and that
decision was appealed. 9 7 Screening panels usually address truly routine
cases. 198 The panel was justified in retaining jurisdiction to decide the
appeal of the preliminary injunction on the merits because it had already
invested considerable judicial resources in the stay issue,' 99 but the action
did provoke comment.
The panel concluded that Proposition 209 was consistent with the U.S.
Constitution, vacated the preliminary injunction, and denied the
requested stay.00 Apparently someone called for en banc rehearing of the
case and the effort failed.2"' Four judges dissented in a published
opinion.0 2 Those judges read the relevant Supreme Court precedents
differently from the panel, and concluded that "the panel holds that the
measure is constitutional... in violation of its duty to follow controlling
Supreme Court precedent."2 3 Judge Norris's dissent, with which three
judges concurred, criticized the panel for "inject[ing] into [the] analysis a
test that looks to the personal views of individual judges about the
relative merits of affirmative action programs and antidiscrimination
laws. 204 He found certain of the panel's arguments "remarkable," and
that the panel "puts its own spin" on others.0 5
197. Id. at 698-99 & n.5.
198. The Ninth Circuit hears preliminary injunctions in screening panels, regardless of their
importance, because preliminary injunctions are especially time sensitive.
199. See Gregorio T. v. Wilson, 54 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 1995); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1657 (1994);
9th Cir. R. 3-3.
200. Coalitionfor Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 711.
201. Id. (rejecting suggestion for rehearing en bane).
202. The fact that four judges dissented in a published opinion says nothing of how many voted
for or against en banc rehearing. These four either wrote or joined a written dissent, but judges
regularly vote against rehearing a case en banc without publishing an opinion later to explain why.
203. Coalitionfor Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 713 (Norris, J., dissenting from decision not to rehear
case en banc); see also id. at 717 (Hawkins, J., commenting on decision not to rehear case en bane)
(noting that while panel may well have correctly predicted direction of Supreme Court
decisionmaking, controlling precedent at time of decision required opposite result).
204. Id. at 716.
205. Id. Ninth Circuit dissents are full of phrases such as "this remarkable argument" or "that
novel approach." See, e.g., Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson, 138 F.3d 1270, 1275 (9th Cir.
1998) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); Coalition for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 716; Thompson v.
Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1065 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd in part, 118 S. Ct. 1489 (1998) (Hall, J.,
dissenting); id. at 1060-61 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85 F.3d
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Judge Norris then launched into a lecture to his more junior colleagues
on the Coalition panel about the burdens of stare decisis that they cannot
have appreciated. He stated:
Faithful adherence to precedent does not always come easily....
We must sometimes implement precedent that comes into conflict
with our most deeply held personal convictions....
It is the responsibility of all federal judges, however, to "struggle
to accept [that burden]."2 6
The Norris dissent concluded that "the Coalition panel has neglected this
duty in favor of a path of conservative judicial activism. 20 7
Obviously those who dissented in writing from the decision not to
rehear the case en banc disagreed strongly with the panel decision; they
would not have written otherwise. The stare decisis section of Judge
Norris's dissent can have performed little service other than to vent
frustration that the law was being interpreted differently from how he
would have done it. Unfortunately, that venting may have damaged
interpersonal relations between colleagues who must continue to work
together long after Proposition 209 becomes deeply imbedded in
California's constitutional structure.
3. Harris v. Vasquez and Thompson v. Calderon: Adventures in Death
Penalty Jurisprudence
Someday when the history of the decline in Ninth Circuit collegiality
is written, the cases brought by Robert Alton Harris, who in 1992
became the first man to be executed in the Ninth Circuit states in many
1440, 1444 (9th Cir. 1996) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg,
117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). Such language, while sometimes appropriate under the circumstances, no
doubt stings the author of analysis under critique. Possibly the writers forget what they sound like to
the judges who crafted the "remarkable" or "ludicrous" language under attack. Perhaps the writers'
ears become dulled; they have said and heard them so often themselves. In any event, the arguments
so called are rarely remarkable; for the most part, they are simply the opposite side of the
jurisprudential coin. As Justice Ginsberg has written, "one must be sensitive to the sensibilities and
mindsets of one's colleagues, which may mean avoiding certain arguments and authorities, even
certain words" such as "folly," "ludicrous," "outrageous," words which frequently show up in
dissenting opinions. Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185,
1194-95 (1992); see also Posner, supra note 126, at 353-54; Seitz, supra note 177, at 27.
206. Coalitionfor Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 717 (citations omitted).
207. Id.
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years,20 8 may well loom as a turning point. Ninth Circuit judges issued
four stays of Harris' execution, after which the Supreme Court forbade
the lower courts from entering any more." 9 At least one was issued when
Harris was already in the gas chamber."' Some judges seemed to turn on
their colleagues who believed the law allowed Harris's execution. In a
Yale Law Journal article Ninth Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt wrote
that the panel opinion vacating a district court stay of Harris's execution
"was a one-time opinion, good for Robert Alton Harris only.
Nevertheless, it accomplished its purpose., 21' This and other rhetoric
made it sound as if the panel members looked forward to Harris's
execution. Other judges excoriated the Supreme Court; Judge John
Noonan called the Court's stay ban "treason" to the Constitution.2 2 It
was not a happy moment for the Court.
Nor was the Harris case an isolated incident. Every death penalty case
is an adventure on the Ninth Circuit. Perhaps the most bizarre episode
occurred just last year in Thompson v. Calderon."1 3 Two judges
apparently missed a court-imposed deadline to call for en banc
consideration in Thompson's death penalty habeas corpus appeal,
perhaps due to an error in their office filing systems or perhaps due to a
malfunction in the circuit's e-mail system.2"4 We may never know for
sure. The case ultimately went en banc, "to consider whether to recall the
mandate to consider whether the panel decision of our court would result
in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 2 ' 5
In the opinions the Thompson en banc process produced, judges
quarreled over three issues. The first was whether the panel made an
unprecedented refusal to allow a late en banc call or whether those
wishing to call for en banc failed to follow well-established procedures
to get an extension.21' This spectacle provoked one judge to reassure the
208. See Evan Caminker & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Lawless Execution of Robert Alton Harris,
102 Yale L.J. 225, 225 (1992); see also Harris v. Vasquez, 961 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1992).
209. See Reinhardt, supra note 125, at 209-14.
210. Id. at 212-15.
211. Id. at208.
212. See Carlsen, supra note 26.
213. 120 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 1997) [Thompson I], rev'd in part, 118 S. Ct. 1489 (1998).
214. Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1061 [Thompson 11], rev'd in part, 118 S. Ct. 1489
(1998). This is what Judge Reinhardt implies in his concurrence. I do not know and since no one
conclusively says one way or the other in print, I could not say if I did know.
215. Thompson I, 120 F.3d at 1043.
216. Thompson II, 120 F.3d at 1065 (Hall, J., dissenting); id. at 1067 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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mob that "[n]o one will ever get my vote to execute an innocent man
because ajudge or a lawyer missed a deadline." 7
The second issue was whether the en bane panel overstepped its own
mandate on en bane by deciding the merits of the appeal.21 ' Dissenters
from the decision to go en bane warned that the en bane court would
decide the merits, which was contrary to their understanding of the en
bane order.219 The en bane majority ultimately agreed that it had decided
the merits of the appeal appropriately.22 Two judges then filed orders
showing that they too had dissented from the decision to go en bane-
after the en bane opinion came down!"2
The final issue was the sticky procedural problem of whether recalling
the mandate would give Thompson an unwarranted second bite at the
habeas corpus apple under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996." The legitimacy of taking the case en bane at all had rested
on the assumption that Ninth Circuit judges had made procedural errors,
and therefore, the court was "acting not upon the basis of Thompson's
petition, but upon the basis of our sua sponte determination to remedy
our own errors.""'2 A scuffle broke out, however, when Judge Kozinski's
dissent quoted liberally from five separate memoranda circulated on the
court's internal electronic mail system" in order to establish that the
panel's conduct, the en bane process, and the issuance of the mandate
had occurred within the rules and there had been no "errors" to justify
recalling the mandate.' Judge Kozinski's dissent was a revealing look at
internal workings of the court, particularly when it argued that some
statements by members of the majority were perhaps "contrary to
fact."'" 6 The dissent served its purpose, but it did so at the expense of
breaking an ironclad rule of confidentiality that allows judges to speak
217. Id. at 1072 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 1048-51.
219. Thompson I, 120 F.3d at 1045 (Rymer, J., dissenting from decision to rehear case en banc).
220. Thompson , 120 F.3d at 1051.
221. Thompson , 120 F.3d. at 1045 (orders of Fernandez & Rymer, JJ.).
222. Thompson MI, 120 F.3d at 1064 (Hall, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 1049 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (Supp. II 1996)).
224. The court communicates almost exclusively by an internal electronic mail system. E-mail is
quicker than regular mail, less laborious than fax machines, and has the benefit of allowing all
judges involved in a matter to be informed on all issues. Judges may occasionally call each other on
the phone, but this should occur rarely where court business is at issue.
225. Thompson 11, 120 F.3d at 1067-69.
226. Id. at 1068 n.3 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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freely during deliberations, a violation of "judicial privilege." Judge
Kozinski did something that simply is not done, and that judges trust will
not be done.227 Yet, the primary issue in this case was whether internal
procedures had occurred the way the majority said they had. These were
issues that judges were not supposed to talk about in public; but in
Thompson, if you could not talk about internal communications, you
could not talk relevantly at all. The legitimacy of the entire en banc
proceeding rested on the substance of those internal memoranda. History
and its colleagues will judge the magnitude of the breach.
Judge Reinhardt fired back furiously that Judge Kozinski's dissent
was an "unfortunate document," and that "[p]erhaps to those who read
his recent musings in The New Yorker magazine regarding his personal
experiences in voting in death penalty cases, Judge Kozinski's rambling
analysis will come as no surprise." 2 8 Judge Reinhardt stated that some of
Judge Kozinski's arguments against heightened procedural safeguards in
capital cases were "bizarre and horrifying," and "unworthy of any
jurist."2 9 He contradicted the inferences from the memoranda Judge
Kozinski had quoted. He denied that the court operated the way Judge
Kozinski's quoted communications suggested. He pointed out that "[t]he
reader might be surprised to read, for example, the contents of a
communication from Judge Kozinski in this case, if I were uncollegial
enough to include it in this opinion.""2
From beginning to end, Thompson was an unmitigated disaster for the
court. The Supreme Court has since held that the Ninth Circuit abused its
discretion when it recalled the mandate in Thompson."' Time will tell if
the case leaves an interpersonal tangle that is more difficult to put right.
227. Judge Kozinski clearly felt provoked to reveal internal communications by what he believes
was a breach of greater magnitude by the majority on the en banc panel, and it is notable that he did
attract a second judge highly respected for collegiality, Thomas G. Nelson, to join his opinion. The
opinions in the Thompson cases are not examples of "uncollegiality" themselves, but rather are
evidence of deeper, disconcerting rifts on the court.
228. Thompson 11, 120 F.3d at 1060 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). Judge Reinhardt was referring to
Alex Kozinski, Tinkering with Death, New Yorker, Feb. 10, 1997, at 48, 48.
229. Thompson 11, 120 F.3d at 1060 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
230. Id. at 1062 n.3 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
231. Calderon v. Thompson, 118 S. Ct. 1489 (1998).
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4. Intemperate Language Reveals Problems of Collegiality
These cases do not and should not inspire confidence. The price of
this sort of behavior is high, and it does not matter whether the Ninth
Circuit is worse than other circuits on the collegiality front for one to
conclude that these public displays of distemper are not acceptable in the
long run. First, a collegial atmosphere on a court probably improves the
quality of its work product, which is better for all who must live under
the law that court hands down. As Chief Judge Wilkinson has argued:
Collegiality may be the first casualty of expansion on the federal
appellate courts. I recognize that to speak of collegiality may have a
quaint and antique ring. Collegiality is one of those soft, intangible
words which may ring hollow upon the congressional ear. Judges,
however, have a deep conviction that a collegial court does a better
job.
Of course, I cannot demonstrate empirically that the quality of
decisionmaking is better on a circuit court that does not number in
the dozens, and I recognize that strained relationships are as
possible in smaller bodies as in larger ones. I believe nonetheless
that at heart the appellate process is a deliberative process, and that
one engages in more fruitful interchanges with colleagues whom
one deals with day after day than with judges who are simply faces
in the crowd. Collegiality personalizes the judicial process. It
contributes to the dialogue and to the mutual accommodations that
underlie sound judicial decisions. Smaller courts by and large
encourage more substantial investments in relationships and in the
reciprocal respect for differing views that lie at the heart of what
appellate justice is about. 2
Second, to the extent that intemperate language degenerates into personal
attacks, it makes future agreement and trust all the more difficult. 3
Further, as Judge Harrison Winter of the Fourth Circuit has pointed out,
intemperate language undermines public respect for the judiciary more
generally:
232. Wilkinson, supra note 105, at 1173-74 (footnotes omitted).
233. Harrison L. Winter, Goodwill and Dedication, in Federal Appellate Judiciary in the Twenty-
First Century 169 (Cynthia Harrison & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1989).
Washington Law Review
[A] court is a very fragile institution. We couldn't possibly go out
and enforce all of our decrees and all of our judgments. We don't
have the staff; the marshals could not do it. Our effectiveness
depends upon people accepting our judgments and abiding by our
decisions willingly. We rely on public confidence and public
acceptance. When the public sees that we're hurling words that
verge on insult, especially on a point about which there can
legitimately be an intellectual difference, we destroy the very basis
on which we must ultimately depend.3 4
The problems intemperate language create are the problems of a lack of
collegiality more generally.
5. Shortage of "Face Time": Too Many Judges Too Far Apart
Why is collegiality a challenge on the Ninth Circuit that seems to
bubble up at inconvenient moments? A fairly junior judge once told me a
story about how collegiality can be born and grow even in the face of
strong disagreement. The junior judge was scheduled to serve on a week-
long, three-judge panel with a more senior and more influential judge
with whom he had two public disagreements, one about a court
administration matter and the other about an legal issue under en banc
consideration on which the junior judge had taken a leading role on the
minority side. The two judges had not sat together on a regular week-
long calendar in recent memory, and worse, a number of cases they were
scheduled to hear raised issues very similar to the en banc issue.
Needless to say, the more junior judge was looking forward to the week
with some trepidation.
Listening to the more senior judge question attorneys on the first day
of argument, the junior judge was struck with disbelief. The senior judge
seemed to have modified his view on the en banc issue! It turned out that
the senior judge's view was not what the junior judge had previously
understood it to be, and after a week of talking out several cases together,
the more junior judge's view became more congruent with that of his
more senior colleague. When they got back to their chambers, the senior
judge joined the more junior judge's separate opinion in the en banc
case. Others followed the more senior judge's lead, changing the impact
of the ultimate majority opinion. The junior judge and the senior judge
continued their disagreements on other matters, but discovered they
234. Id.; see also Ginsberg, supra note 205, at 1194.
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could work together more easily on them than before. What made the
difference? The junior judge's view was that "face time," or the
opportunity to get to know each other better both professionally and
personally over the course of a week, had turned the tide. 5
Everyone talks about how important collegiality is on courts, but it is
not easy to attain. Unlike many employment situations, judges have little
ability to choose their colleagues, but are forced frequently to disagree
and critique each other's performance. As Chief Judge Richard Posner
has put it, "To be an appellate judge is a little like being married in a
system of arranged marriage with no divorce." 6 Under those conditions,
collegiality and even civility are hard work. Judge Patricia Wald of the
D.C. Circuit has noted that judges would be well advised to make
affirmative efforts to stay in touch with their colleagues at a social level
in order to get the face time necessary to maintain collegial relations."
"Even in the same building, months can go by if one does not make a
conscious effort to keep in touch socially.""2
Unlike judges on the D.C. Circuit, Ninth Circuit judges are not all in
the same building, so they do not have the luxury of going out to lunch
once a week to stay in contact. Ninth Circuit judges are the most far-
flung of all appellate courts in the country. Even their "forced" social
activities such as Christmas parties, court meetings, and judicial
conferences are just a drop in the collegiality bucket. People do not get to
know and respect each other in the deeply rooted ways that help them get
through tough challenges, such as Compassion in Dying or Thompson v.
Calderon, over a fifteen-minute cocktail. Calendars and screening panels
are the best opportunities for the kind of extensive "face time" necessary
to resolve real-life disputes, providing practice, if you will, in relatively
low pressure situations, needed to promote the true understanding
leading to genuine collegiality that will stand up when times get tough.239
235. See also Edith H. Jones, Back to the Future for Federal Appeals Courts: Rationing Federal
Justice by Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1485, 1498 (1995) ("Collegiality results
from familiarity and from working closely with other members of the court; these work experiences
will necessarily decline as the court's size expands.").
236. Posner, supra note 126, at 355.
237. Patricia M. Wald, Calendars, Collegiality, and Other Intangibles on the Courts of Appeals,
in Federal Appellate Judiciary in the Twenty-First Century, supra note 233, at 181.
238. Id.
239. Jones, supra note 235, at 1498. Unfortunately, each Ninth Circuit judge sits on only seven
regular panels and two screening panels per year, and often those screening panels are conducted via
conference calls.
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Unfortunately, because there are so many Ninth Circuit judges, it is
conceivable that years could go by between the time when Judge A had
last sat on a calendar or screening panel with Judge B. A number of
senior and active judges may never have sat on a regular or screening
panel with the junior judges appointed in the 1990s. The problem is
made worse by the fact that the Ninth Circuit relies on so many district
and other visiting judges to fill out panels. This means that, instead of
getting face time with two Ninth Circuit colleagues on any given panel,
the average panel provides the opportunity to get to know only one other
active colleague, if any. Appointing more judges, the oft-mentioned
solution to the Ninth Circuit's ills that would put more active judges on
panels,24° would actually make matters worse. It is simply tough to get
around to all your colleagues when there are so many of them.
24
'
The real problem, therefore, is not that Ninth Circuit judges are
unpleasant people, or socially awkward, or modem Howard Hughes-type
hermits. Every Ninth Circuit judge I met while clerking was remarkably
charming, devoted to the best aspects of his or her work, and seemed
genuinely interested in making the Ninth Circuit a pleasant place to
work. The real problem is that there are too many judges too far apart.
Even a collection of the most socially adept characters could not
overcome this structural problem. Two smaller collections of judges will
each be more collegial than one large collection.242
6. The "Cocoon Problem ": Another Reason Why Adding More Staff
Only Makes Matters Worse
Collegiality problems tend to feed on themselves, and adding more
staff will not alleviate these problems. Ask the average U.S. Senator who
retired in the 1990s because the institution had lost some of its
collegiality and civility243 why it happened and each will have a number
of reasons. Sooner or later, most will mention the proliferation of both
central and personal staffs. Staff creates a "cocoon" around the senator,
taking over many of the inter-office communications and other tasks that
240. This is the solution many Ninth Circuit judges prefer. See, e.g., Hug, supra note 30, at 292;
Reinhardt, supra note 100, at 52. In 1998, the Senate confirmed three new Ninth Circuit judges.
241. Tobias, supra note 41, at 590.
242. See Jones, supra note 235, at 1498; Wilkinson, supra note 105, at 1173.
243. Collegiality, civility, courtesy: these are some of the proudest hallmarks of the U.S. Senate,
and their degeneration is disappointing. See generally Norman Omstein et al., The Contemporary
Senate, in Congress Reconsidered 16-18 (Lawrence Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 1981).
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used to be done face to face, effectively isolating each senator from his
or her colleagues. No longer are senators' closest and most regular
professional interpersonal relationships with their colleagues; instead,
they are with trusted staff members and advisors.
The same becomes true for many judges, which is part of the reason
simply increasing the size of a judge's staff to solve workload problems
would ultimately be a double-edged sword.2" Judicial staffs cannot
expand as quickly as senate staffs, but the nature of the job of judging,
particularly where judges are so physically removed from each other, is
such that judges increasingly lose regular contact with their former
colleagues or those relationships become stilted. As a practical matter,
some judges may find it hard work to get along with other judges.
Judges' staffs, on the other hand, are generally made up of the same
types of talented and intriguing people that the judges find interesting;
this is one of the reasons the judge hired them. Further, one of the jobs of
a judicial staff member is to support and admire the judge for whom he
works. No wonder easy staff relationships eventually take the place of
the more complicated relationships with colleagues.
As in the Senate, work between chambers on courts of appeals
sometimes gets done at a "staff level." Some is informal: Judge X's
secretary telephones Judge Y's secretary to mention that a cosmetic
change is necessary in Judge Y's most recent opinion, and the change is
made, possibly without consulting Judge Y, because Judge Y's secretary
"knows how he likes to handle these matters." Sometimes it is formal.
For each case heard by a three-judge panel, one judge's chambers is
chosen to write a bench memorandum to be circulated to the other
chambers. Some judges use them and others rely on their own staff's
summaries. Some judges take the opportunity bench memoranda provide
to get their views on the case across and others give their clerks a free
hand to write their own views.
As Paul Carrington, Daniel Meador, and Maurice Rosenberg warned
more than twenty years ago in Justice on Appeal, the proliferation of
personal and central staff has changed the character of courts.245 Judges
more and more resemble administrators instead of craftsmen, not
244. The other reason, alluded to earlier, is the inefficiency of increased bureaucratization on the
court. See supra Part III.A.5.
245. Carrington, supra note 7, at 45-46; Posner, supra note 126, at 141, 145; see also Lauren K.
Roebel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 BYU L. Rev. 3, 41-43
(1990).
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necessarily with positive results. 46 They allow staff to write more and
more of the work that goes out under their names.247 They also tend to
confer more with their staffs rather than with their colleagues and may
well have become less receptive to peer argument.248 They begin to look
more like autonomous individuals-lone rangers, if you will-than
group members. This kills off the institutional collegiality that has made
American appellate courts work for two hundred years.
To varying extents, all circuits face these problems. Only changes in
workload Of a magnitude not contemplated in this Article, thereby
eliminating the need for three or four clerks and two secretaries, could
solve the cocoon problem directly, but adding more staff to solve
workload problems would certainly exacerbate it. Splitting the Ninth
Circuit into two smaller units could blunt some of the cocoon problem's
impact, however. When the professional interpersonal relationships of
the judges become less tight, it is natural that staff will wittingly or
unwittingly step in to fill the void. This has the circular effect of
insulating the judges from each other even more and exacerbating any
collegiality problems that already exist. On a smaller court, judges get
more face time with each other, and group decisionmaking for the court
therefore becomes easier. The cocoon problem never develops fully, and
matters never get worse as a result. It is really a chicken and egg
problem, but solving such a problem is not really about which came first;
killing either one kills off the entire chicken-and-egg process.
Almost all circuits have considerable staff; in fact, there are national
standards about how many in-chambers staff members (secretaries and
law clerks) a judge may have.249 The Ninth Circuit's problem is worse,
however, because it has more central staff." Most of the Ninth Circuit's
efficiency reforms that allow it to deal not just with excess workload, but
also with a larger caseload, involve additional staff and additional staff
activity on matters that judges would otherwise do themselves." Adding
in-chambers staff to address workload issues is also bound to backfire.
246. Carrington, supra note 7, at 45.
247. Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 Yale L.J 1442, 1446 (1983);
Wade H. MeCree, Jr., Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 777, 787 (198 1);
Posner, supra note 126, at 143; Stephen Reinhardt, Surveys Without Solutions: Another Study of the
United States Courts ofAppeals, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1505, 1511 (1995).
248. Carrington, supra note 7, at 45-46.
249. See Posner, supra note 126, at 141 n.29.
250. See Meador, supra note 39, at 196-97.
251. See Hug, supra note 30, at 301.
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The U.S. Congress's experience is that additional central staff resulted in
more work, not less, because additional staff inspired new constituent
service efforts, oversight projects and legislation. 2 Therefore, the
additional central staff hired to help solve the Ninth Circuit's workload
problem may have already made it worse, and there is no reason to think
in-chambers staff would have a different impact. Further, since many
judges' administrative responsibilities (such as serving as en bane
coordinator) are so extensive, those judges may have the benefit of
additional staff resources on a permanent, central, or ad hoc basis to help
out. All these differences simply place more people in between judges at
every step of the process.
7. The Mini-legislature Problem
It is easy to compare the number of filings in the Ninth Circuit with
the paltry number of judges and wish President Clinton and Congress
would figure out how to get more judicial personnel onto the Ninth
Circuit, as they recently began to do.253 Yet, maybe the western states
should be happy they do not have the judges they deserve. The Ninth
Circuit would have twenty-eight judges if fully staffed. The Court has
requested ten more, for a total of thirty-eight. 4 Add to that the Ninth
Circuit's complement of sixteen senior judges, and you have a larger
court than the upper houses of many state legislatures. The Ninth Circuit
is not a court; it is a congress.
Congresses are not just large courts, however. Chief Judge Posner and
Judge Frank Easterbrook have written of the risk that large courts may
begin to resemble legislatures, and the seeds have been sown on the
Ninth Circuit.ss According to Judge Posner:
Plurality opinions, concurring opinions, shifting coalitions,
frequent overrulings (many not acknowledged as such),
inconsistent lines of precedent-in other words, the manifold
institutional failings of appellate courts-are... the consequences
of the fact that a multi-member court is an electoral body; for the
theory of public choice teaches that electorates, and legislatures
252. See, e.g., Mark Bisnow, In the Shadow of the Dome: Chronicles of a Capitol Hill Aide 309
(1990); Congressional Q., Inc., How Congress Works 106 (1983).
253. After a dry spell of two years, Congress confirmed three Ninth Circuit appointees in the first
four months of 1998 and another since then.
254. See O'Scannlain, supra note 59, at 315.
255. See Posner, supra note 126, at 364-68.
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composed of elected representatives, cannot be expected to make
rationally consistent decisions." 6
Unfortunately, providing specific examples of what I interpret as the
seeds of a legislative culture on the Ninth Circuit would require revealing
confidential communications, but the mere size of the court is suggestive.
So is the fact that many Ninth Circuit lawyers think that more than in
other circuits, the composition of the panel will determine the outcome of
the appeal. 7 Chief Judge Posner explains the phenomenon as follows:
The model that [assumes legislative behavior in appellate
courts] assumes that each judge is an individualist. The judge may
consult with his colleagues before making up his mind but once he
does make it up he will do everything he can to make the law
conform to it. Almost my entire point in this chapter is that federal
judges have too individualistic a conception of their role. If judges
were more committed (emotionally, not just intellectually) to the
idea of collective judicial responsibility; if, reminding themselves
that judicial appointment is usually not purely meritocratic, they
took themselves and their particular ideas and approaches less
seriously; if they were more willing to give ground freely and to
search for common ground in the way that a corporate task force
might try to devise a marketing strategy for one of the corporation's
products, then we would have a judicial system that generated less
heat but more light.s
Individualistic, of course, is exactly what Ninth Circuit judges are.29
They tend to be isolated physically and imbedded in a cocoon by their
staffs. And there are so many of them! They are ripe for the mini-
legislature problem.
Why would a certain amount of legislative activity be such a bad thing
on an appellate court? The desired institutional behavior of courts and
congresses are different, as is the behavior of their individual members.
Consider the following example. Judge A states she has decided to vote
in favor of en banc in a case she would not normally consider en banc
worthy, because Judge B had voted in favor of en banc in a prior case
largely on the basis of Judge A's interest in the case, and Judge B is now
256. Id. at 364-65.
257. Id. at 137.
258. Id. at 365-66.
259. See Carlsen, supra note 26.
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insistent that the current case go en banc.2 60 To anyone familiar with the
wheeling and dealing that goes on in the average state legislature or the
U.S. Congress, this example is tame. Standard operating procedure is for
one legislator to vote for another legislator's bill in return for a "yes"
vote on another bill. That is how deals are made.
The problem is that appellate court decisionmaking is not about
making deals.261 That is legislative activity. Legislatures operate by
constructing and maintaining ever-shifting coalitions so that majorities,
at any given moment on any given issue, may work their wills. Some
legislatures make it easier or harder to do that based on their own
concerns for minority views, but the point of the process is to varying
degrees the same.
2 62
These legislative goals simply do not have much to do with what
courts are all about. Figuring out what the law is requires judges to vote
on alternate possibilities from time to time, and it certainly requires a
great deal of give and take. That has nothing to do, however, with the
legislative goal of giving everyone something of what they want in order
to the keep the majority together.163 Federal judges should have no
constituencies to please. By definition they have no seats to protect. All
the give and take, all the redrafting, all the en banc calls-these are
efforts to get to the truth of what the law says, to the "correct" result.
Statesmanship abounds more than we think in our legislatures, and
260. Such an example is plausible, but has not, to my knowledge, ever occurred.
261. And neither, by the way, is my example. After all, Judge A did not promise a vote on Judge
B's pet en bane in order to get Judge B's vote on his own en bane. Were the case slightly different, I
would be arguing that Judge A should be commended for his zealous collegiality in terms of the
respect he is showing publicly for Judge B's good judgment. There is a fine line between the two.
262. Compare, for example, the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate. While the
House follows majority rule both dejure and de facto, the cloture rule in the Senate means that body
effectively has a 60% voting rule on many issues. See Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule 22.2,
Senate Manual, 101st Cong. (1989). Due to a variety of rules, most Senate work must be done in
practice by unanimous consent, which allows one senator to hold up the process for a very long time.
See generally Walter J. Oleszek, Legislative Procedures and Congressional Policymaking: A
Bicameral Perspective, in Congressional Politics 176, 176-77, 183-88 (Christopher J. Deering ed.,
1989). An example is Senator Conrad Bums's decision to place a "hold" on all nominees to the
Ninth Circuit until Congress splits the circuit. Bums, supra note 40, at 248. The House, on the other
hand, has a committee that establishes temporary rules for the consideration of each bill that must be
passed by a majority to go into effect. In other words, House business is conducted on terms
acceptable to a majority of members, but not necessarily all. Oleszek, supra, at 178-83. The Senate
is well understood to be a legislative body concerned with the rights and views of the minority, while
the House is one set up so that the majority existing at any given moment has complete power to
vork its will. Id. at 176-77.
263. See Barbara Sinclair, Majority Leadership in the U.S. House 128-29 (1983).
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congressmen care a great deal about what the "best" policy is; but, at the
end of the day, their first concern has to be to produce the most popular
result."6 If it ever was, the federal system is no longer a common law
system in either the British or American state law sense. Federal judges
do not "make" very much law; they take existing law, usually starting
with a statute or the U.S. Constitution, and interpret what it means,
relying on their own previous interpretations for guidance. Interpretation
in this sense has a creative element, but it is quite limited. There is
simply no need for legislative behavior on a U.S. appeals court.
The Ninth Circuit already demonstrates an unhealthy legislative
tendency. Why, for instance, have publishing dissents to decisions to go
en banc, or worse, not to go en banc, become such a necessity? The
decision to take a case en banc should be an institutional decision. Yet,
dissenting opinions look alarmingly like the "minority views" attached to
congressional committee reports.165 As a political matter, a legislative
minority has a constituency to please and the opportunity to get its views
into the record does show those groups that the minority was active in
the process and will "live to fight another day." '266 Are the same concerns
about constituencies and "fighting another day" relevant or healthy in the
judicial world where life-tenure judges are supposedly constrained by
stare decisis? As a legal matter, what minority views generally succeed
in doing is confusing readers into thinking that there is some legal
significance in the losing side. Why should judges be interested in
confusing the public on the state of the law? Are these the raisons d'etre
behind a dissent from a decision not to take a case en banc? They must
be intended to flag the case for the Supreme Court. I can think of no
264. One hopes that the "best" policy will be the most popular, and of course, one of the ways one
can built a coalition for the "best" policy is to convince constituents to like it, which in turn,
motivates their elected representatives to vote for it.
265. Separate opinions to panel decisions of all kinds, according to Chief Judge Posner, also look
like "minority views," but there is a stronger argument for them in those situations. See Posner,
supra note 126, at 364.
266. For example, a dissent to a decision concerning en bane has the merit of partially pulling
back the shroud from what could otherwise not be revealed under the rules: who voted how.
Obviously, a judge probably has the right to announce his vote, although it is not easy to see why he
should wish to do so. Judges have no constituencies to whom they must formally announce their
views (except for Supreme Court judge-pickers, perhaps), and most law reviews would drool to have
a circuit-judge written article, if the judge in question feels the need to bare his soul. The real
problem is that by revealing his own vote, the judge in question unwittingly indicates how others
may have voted.
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other reason, except to kill even more trees than would otherwise be
necessary to print the already bloated volumes of F.3d.267
Most legislatures tend to break down into coalitions.268 Sometimes
these are strongly partisan, such as those operating on a parliamentary
basis, and sometimes they are less so, such as in the U.S. Congress.
Many observers believe coalitions develop on the Ninth Circuit as
well,269 and to a greater or lesser extent that is fairly obviously true at
least in the relatively few matters that break down on a regional or
partisan basis. It may be true even more often. On a busy court, there is
not enough time to have an independent understanding of every issue, so
naturally, judges look for substitutes. One such substitute is a trusted
colleague. On a large court where the judges have a much harder time
getting to knoW and trust each other personally, there can be little
surprise that judges substitute the understandings of judges "who think
like I do," for some of their own understandings of issues. Party
affiliation is a good way to find those judges.
There is ample circumstantial evidence that this goes on-the only
question is its extent. No judge nominated by a Republican president
wrote or joined a written dissent from the decision to rehear the
Proposition 209 case en banc, and all the members of the unanimous
panel who upheld the California ban on public affirmative action were
appointed by Republican presidents.27 All seven judges who wrote or
joined a published dissent from the decision to go to en banc rehearing in
267. There is one, I suppose: helping lawyers know how to apply the en bane rules (or not, as the
case generally is) so they can better sense when a suggestion for rehearing en bane would be useful.
Dissents from decisions not to go en bane have almost no utility in achieving that goal, however.
Where the dissent addresses the en bane rules, the dissenting judge's interpretation is, after all, the
one that did not carry the day. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 711 (9th Cir.
1997) (Schroeder, J., dissenting from decision not to take case en bane); Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 85 F.3d 1440, 1441-42 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117
S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from decision not to go to full court en bane).
Second, most such dissents are devoted not to whether a case is appropriate for en bane rehearing
under the rules, but to criticizing the panel's decision, often written by judges who were not privy to
the briefs, the oral argument, or the judges' conference afterwards.
268. For a discussion of coalition behavior in the U.S. Congress, see Patricia A. Hurley, Parties
and Coalitions in Congress, in Congressional Politics, supra note 262, at 113, 113-34 and the
unfortunately titled, but fascinating and useful book by William F. Connelly, Jr. & John J. Pitney,
Jr., Congress' Permanent Minority: Republicans in the U.S. House 19-36 (1994), for an explanation
of the informal and intraparty coalitions that also play a significant role in formulating policy.
269. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 126, at 137.
270. Coalition for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 696 (3-0 decision with opinion by O'Scannlain,
Leavy, & Kleinfeld, JJ.).
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Thompson v. Calderon, a death penalty case, were Republicans."' In a
non-en banc situation, both judges who voted to award extraordinarily
high attorneys fees to lawyers litigating a "laughably easy" abortion case
were Democrats, while the dissenting judge was a Republican. 272
Obviously, not all judges vote with members of their own party on every
issue, not even all the hot-button issues. Otherwise, who could explain
Judge John Noonan's fury over the Robert Alton Harris case?273 A mere
correlation between party voting does not indicate any sort of pernicious
causation. Not all Republicans believe affirmative action is
unconstitutional, and not all Democrats are completely sympathetic to
the travails of attorneys fighting restrictions on abortion. The
overwhelming majority of cases and decisions have nothing to do with
partisan views. There are reasons, however, that outsid observers think
that the party affiliations of the judges determine many results, as they
seem to do in so many high-profile cases. To the extent that the fire from
which this smoke emanates may spread, the Ninth Circuit has a real
problem. The lack of judicial independence it suggests, the breakdown in
stare decisis, the implicit confirmation of legal realism: none of these
bode well for the Ninth Circuit's image. If they were actually descriptive
of the institution, it would be alarming. If it walks like a legislature and
talks like a legislature, well, it is a legislature. Except that it is not.
Happily, the mini-legislature disease on the Ninth Circuit is not very
far advanced, but even the slightest development has damaging
separation of powers implications. Splitting the circuit would help
ameliorate the problem by decreasing the number of judges making
decisions together, increasing the ease of their doing so, and probably
making the two new institutions less reliant on staff to do work judges
should be doing. To the extent that the size of the institution encourages
legislative-type institutional behaviors, a split can help.
D. The Icebox Split Would Eliminate Damaging Geographic
Polarization
Alaska erupted when three Ninth Circuit Californians shocked the
state with the conclusion that the native corporation system of the Alaska
271. See Thompson v. Calderon, Nos. 95-99014, 95-99015 CV 89-3630-RG (July 28, 1997).
272. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 100 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 1996)
(Pregerson & Hawkins, JJ., affirming, Kozinski, J., dissenting).
273. See supra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
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Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA)274 did not eliminate Indian
Country in Alaska.275 Both average Alaskans and the local lawyers who
were instrumental in drafting ANCSA thought the law had done the
exact opposite, and Alaskan society had been organized for the past
twenty years around that assumption. After Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats
School District v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government,276 three
more California judges granted an injunction to halt summer construction
on an Alaskan highway project pending appeal, which had the effect of
delaying the project through the entire building season.277 As a result, the
powerful Alaska senators and representatives lost their tempers and
became even more committed to a split that would wrest interpretation of
the federal law that is so crucial to Alaska from Californians.
I did not know at the time whether the Venetie decision was correct
under federal law, and the Supreme Court has since told us it was not.27
But at least I have been to Venetie!279 From the perspective of people
whose entire society could conceivably be uprooted, for good or ill, the
Venetie majority opinion is remarkably antiseptic, with no appreciation
of the magnitude of what the court has done.280 The Fairbanks Daily
News-Miner expressed the frustration:
274.43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1642 (1994).
275. Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 101 F.3d
1286 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 948 (1998); see also Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Splitting the Ninth
Circuit, Memorandum to Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals,
May 22, 1998 (on file with author).
276. 101 F.3d 1286.
277. Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Armbrister, 131 F.3d 1285 (9th Cir. 1997). The panel consisted
of judges Wallace, Norman, and Thompson. The panel ultimately permitted the Federal Highway
Administration to construct the highway, but the opinion did not come down until September 2,
1997. Even though construction halted only for a few months, that was most of the Alaskan building
season. It is understandable, as a result, that Alaskans feel misunderstood by their Ninth Circuit
judges. See, e.g., David Whitney, House OKs Study of Ninth Circuit Split, Anch. Daily News, June
4, 1997, atBl.
278. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 118 S. Ct. 948 (1998) (unanimous
opinion).
279. In the interests of fall disclosure, I should probably note that I was there for a total of about
two minutes on a bush mail flight north of the Arctic Circle.
280. This did not go unnoticed by the concurring judge:
We have been asked to confuse matters by applying out-of-date theories to a truly new concept
of Indian relationships and sovereignty. We have been asked to blow up a blizzard of litigation
throughout the State of Alaska as each and every tribe seeks to test the limits of its power over
what it deems to be its Indian country. There are hundreds of tribes, and the litigation
permutations are as vast as the capacity of fine human minds can make them. They can include
claims to freedlom from state taxation and regulation, claims to regulate and tax for tribal
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Right now the judges on this appeals court come to Alaska once
a year to hear cases. Or, to be more exact, a three-judge panel
comes to Alaska once a year. Under normal circumstances, a judge
from the appeals court will come to Alaska about once every 10
years.
Because it is such a rare occurrence, they don't have the time to
become informed and knowledgeable about the two major laws that
affect Alaska and do not affect the other Western states.28'
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act and the Alaska
National Interest Land Conservation Act [ANILCA] are among the
major pieces of legislation approved by Congress in the last 30
years. These laws apply to Alaska, but not to any other state. It's a
good bet that the judges making decisions regarding these laws
have not read ANCSA and ANILCA or know the legislative history
that puts them in context.
They rely on law clerks with little or no knowledge about the
background of those laws.282
But, do not weep too hard for Alaska! Imagine how Idahoans feel; the
Ninth Circuit never goes there!283 At least the court gets to Billings once
in a blue moon.2 4 One may look at the data and conclude California is
purposes, assertions of sovereignty over vast areas of Alaska, and even assertions that tribes can
regulate and tax the various corporations created to hold ANCSA land. The latter assertion
would give the tribes the power to control, regulate, and tax those corporations out of existence
and would provide a fruitful area for intertribal conflict. This is no imaginative parade of
horribles. In the cases before us today, one tribe, Kluti Kaah, seeks sovereignty over an area as
unlike Indian country as one could imagine. The other seeks sovereignty, and has been made
sovereign, over a piece of the State of Alaska about as large as the State of Delaware.
Furthermore, both Kluti Kaah and Venetie assured us at argument that tribes, as they see it, do
have the power to tax and regulate the myriad of private corporations which received land under
ANCSA.
Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1304 (Fernandez, J., concurring).
281. To be completely accurate, one should note that the Ninth Circuit hears Alaska cases in other
cities on a more regular basis. Venetie was heard in Seattle.
282. Twelfth Court Warranted, Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, July 15, 1997, at A-4. Worse, they
come to Alaska in July. If you have not been to Alaska when it is 30 below, you have not
been to Alaska.
283. See 28 U.S.C. § 48 (1994). "Never" is too strong a word. The Court holds no regular sessions
in Boise, but it did sit there to mark the 100th anniversary of Idaho statehood.
284. A panel sat in Billings once during my tenure with the court.
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not over-represented on the court," 5 but it does not help if one comes
from a small state that, by virtue of being in the same circuit as
California, ends up the forgotten man. As Senator Slade Gorton put it, in
the Ninth Circuit, Washington is "the tail on a huge dog." '286 If states
could get out of California's circuit, they would get more respect simply
by becoming comparatively bigger fish in a smaller pond. This, in a
nutshell, is the theory driving many split backers.
"Diversity" is at the heart of many of the Ninth Circuit's assumed
strengths and weaknesses. Is the Ninth Circuit geographically and
culturally diverse or is it dominated by a pernicious "California
influence?" Does the Ninth Circuit bring together the breadth of legal
philosophy or is it narrowly ideological? Those who idealize the Ninth
Circuit's supposed diversity are, at least with the current complement of
judges, making a mountain out of a molehill. Those who claim California
(read: "liberal") judges are poisoning the court's jurisprudence do the
same thing.287 The better conclusion is that the Ninth Circuit is not
diverse; it is polarized and that polarization correlates with a sensible
circuit split.
The first myth dispelled: it is not true that the California judges are
particularly "liberal," if that is even a useful way to think about judges'
views."' Consider, for instance, the party affiliation of the various
judges' appointing presidents. 9 Of the Ninth Circuit's twenty senior and
active judges from California, nine were appointed by Democrats290 and
285. Fifty-five to sixty percent of appeals in the Ninth Circuit come from California, but fewer
than half the judges maintain chambers in that state. See O'Scannlain, supra note 59, at 318; Tobias,
supra note 41, at 589.
286. Carlsen, supra note 26.
287. The court's most outspoken "liberal," Stephen Reinhardt, is indeed a Californian, but so is
the court's most well-known "conservative," Alex Kozinski.
288. Very few legal issues turn on party loyalties or political ideologies. More turn on "legal
philosophies": the degree of deference to be shown to factfinders and district court judges, the value
of legislative history, the role of dicta, rules versus balancing tests. Admittedly, the adherents of the
various sides of these jurisprudential debates often correlate with political ideologies, but that is not
always true.
289. Of course, there are limits to using the party of the appointing president as a benchmark for
ideology. "Conservatism" is not what it was when Richard Nixon was appointing judges, nor is it
clear that he gave much consideration to ideologies anyway. Further, John F. Kennedy and Jimmy
Carter's nominees are not uniformly "liberals."
290. Judges Arthur Alarcon, Robert Boochever (who maintained chambers in Alaska as an active
judge), James R. Browning, Warren Ferguson, Dorothy Nelson, Harry Pregerson, Stephen
Reinhardt, A. Wallace Tashima, and Kim Wardlaw.
Washington Law Review
nine by Republicans.29' More relevantly, five active judges were
appointed by Democrats2 92 and four were appointed by Republicans.293
The most senior of these were appointed by Democratic presidents. In
other words, as time passes, if no more judges are added to the court, the
balance will shift decisively to the Republicans.
One of the reasons California has long seemed liberal is that the court
added ten judges during Jimmy Carter's presidency, and seven of those
went to California. The ideological effect of that increase, real or
perceived, will soon be part of history, because all but two of the Carter
Californians have taken senior status and the seniors are likely to have
continually diminished caseloads as many have now become very senior.
The future ideological makeup of the California contingent will depend
much more on who the voters choose for president and the Senate
majority in 2000.294
Another myth is that California judges somehow dominate the court.
"Domination" is difficult to define, but what can be said is that
California judges are not statistically over-represented in the Ninth
Circuit's judging corps.295 More than half of the court's filings come
from California, but fewer than half of the active judges and total judges
hail from the state. Due largely to the Carter judges phenomenon, for
many years California had the active judges with the most seniority and
held the chief judge's office for what must have seemed an eternity. The
influence of its senior judges, given their institutional knowledge, is still
significant.296 Nevertheless, the Chief Judgeship has since passed to a
Nevadan, en banc and court administration matters are limited to active
judge participation, and as the junior judges gain seniority and its
291. Judges Ferdinand Fernandez, Alfred T. Goodwin, Cynthia Holcomb Hall, Alex Kozinski,
John Noonan, Pamela Rymer, Joseph T. Sneed, David Thompson, and Clifford Wallace.
292. Judges James R. Browning, Harry Pregerson, Stephen Reinhardt, A. Wallace Tashima, and
Kim Wardlaw.
293. Judges Ferdinand Fernandez, Alex Kozinski, Pamela Rymer, and David Thompson.
294. If the voters choose the same party to run both the White House and the Senate and nothing
else changes, that party would take long-term dominance over the Ninth Circuit, as the circuit is
owed so many judges, and the party would likely take advantage of having almost free reign to shape
this large court. Further, most would go to California, as the state is now underrepresented in terms
of both population and caseload.
295. See Tobias, supra note 41, at 589 (stating that 55% of appeals are filed in California).
Eighteen of the thirty-eight ninth Circuit judges are from California, including nine of the twenty-
two active judges. O'Scannlain, supra note 59, at 318 (estimating that 60% of court's appeals are
from California).
296. Three former chiefjudges still on the court are from California, one of whom is still active.
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accompanying confidence, the institutional leadership of now very-senior
Carter Californians will wane.297
A final myth is that the Ninth Circuit's judging corps is richly diverse,
bringing an impressive range of backgrounds and viewpoints to the
court. It is unclear to what people lauding this aspect of the Ninth
Circuit's perceived diversity are referring. In this multi-racial region,
only two of the court's active judges are members of racial minorities. 9 8
Only six are women, and three of these are the most junior judges on the
court.299 There is not much diversity between Los Angeles and Phoenix,
Portland and Seattle. None of the judges came from or now maintains
chambers in what might be called a "rural" area. Only two maintain
chambers in population centers of less 100,000 people."' 0 Former judges
are greatly over-represented on the court compared to their incidence in
the legal community as a whole, while small firm and solo practitioners
are quite under-represented.30 '
What diversity exists on the Ninth Circuit appears to be largely
geographical. Each state in the court has at least one judge.30 2 Eighteen
judges come from California and the other twenty-one come from the
following cities:
Total Actives
Seattle 5 2
Portland 4 2
Phoenix 4 3
Reno 2 2
Boise 2 2
297. The administrative leadership of the court has already shifted to non-Californians. Nevadan
Procter Hug, Jr. is the Chief Judge, Judge Patricia Schroeder will be the next Chief Judge assuming
she continues to serve on the court and realignment does not move her to another circuit, and many
other internal leadership posts have shifted to non-Californians.
298. Judges Ferdinand Fernandez and A. Wallace Tashima. None of the active judges are black or
latino.
299. Judges Betty Fletcher, Susan Graber, Margaret McKeown, Pamela Rymer, Patricia
Schroeder, and Kim Wardlaw.
300. Judges Andrew J. Kleinfeld of Fairbanks, Alaska and Sidney Thomas of Billings, Montana.
301. For example, eight of the court's twenty-two active judges are former judges, obviously
disproportional to the bar as a whole.
302. Only Hawaii lacks an active judge.
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Las Vegas 1 0
Fairbanks 1 1
Honolulu 1 0
Billings 1 1
Although not perfect, the distribution is reasonable.
By comparison, the California judges are not so geographically
diverse. Their state is huge, but their eighteen judges maintain chambers
in just three metropolitan areas, with thirteen in the Los
Angeles/Pasadena metro area alone. The News-Miner may have called it
just right: maybe it is not California that dominates the court, but rather
Los Angeles. 3
What characterizes the Ninth Circuit is not diversity, but polarization.
Take a look at the active judges from the southern part of the circuit.
They include:
Los Angeles metro area: Fernandez, Kozinski, Pregerson,
Reinhardt, Rymer, Tashima, Wardlaw
San Francisco: Browning
Phoenix: Hawkins, Schroeder, Silverman
San Diego: Thompson
Reno: Brunetti, Hug (chief judge)
Compare these to the active judges from the northwest:
Seattle: Fletcher, McKeown
Portland: Graber, O'Scannlain
Boise: Nelson (T.G.), Trott
Billings: Thomas
Fairbanks: Kleinfeld
One difference between the two lists is the size of the cities listed. In
the northwest states, only Seattle counts as a "big" city by national
303. See Twelfth Court Warranted, supra note 282, at Al.
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standards, and by California standards, it is pretty small.3 Most of the
northwestem judges primarily practiced law during their former careers,
and all but Judge Margaret McKeown, Judge Susan Graber, and Judge
Stephen Trott did so in small to medium sized firms, which means they
struggled to meet the proverbial payroll, just like any other small
businessperson in town. Judges Thomas G. Nelson, Andrew J. Kleinfeld,
and Sidney Thomas were all general practitioners; Judge Trott was a
prosecutor; Judge O'Scannlain primarily represented utilities firms;
Judge McKeown did large firm practice; Judge Graber spent most of her
career on the appellate bench; and Judge Kleinfeld was a federal district
judge for several years. Like most small city lawyers, they got to know
the local courtrooms well. The northwestern judges became not just
community, but statewide leaders.3"5 These are the profiles you would
expect of northwestem judges, given the types of communities from
which they come: small city types, community leaders, legal generalists,
small businesspeople. Mixing the smaller city private practitioners with
the handful of other backgrounds creates an attractively diverse and
comparatively representative bench.
The profile in the southern part of the circuit is quite different. Eleven
of the south's fourteen active judges maintain chambers in three of the
nation's largest metropolitan areas, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and
Phoenix, although there are plenty of smaller communities in that part of
the circuit. Many of the judges in the southern part of the circuit
practiced law, but they logged more time on average in large firms or in
government service, with the difference in the culture of law practice that
implies.30 6 Many, such as Judges Pregerson, Fernandez, Rymer, Tashima,
Silverman, and Wardlaw were judges at either the state or federal levels
for many years before joining the Ninth Circuit.307 Others, such as Judges
304. Seattle is no more than a regional legal center, and its importance as a population and
cultural center may well be a passing fad.
305. Judges T.G. Nelson and Andrew Kleinfeld are both former state bar presidents. Judge
Fletcher is a former Seattle/King County bar president and Washington state bar governor. Only
Judge Trott did not spend most of his career in the town where he now maintains his chambers. Prior
to going on the bench, Judge Trott served as a U.S. Attorney in California. Judge McKeown worked
in a large Seattle law firm, although she did spend some years in Washington, D.C.
306. Big firm lawyers do not regularly bicker over a few dollars of child support, nor do they
negotiate many drunk driving pleas. Moreover, large law firms are by definition large institutions,
and therefore more bureaucratic.
307. To be completely accurate, Judge Wardlaw actually served only 25 months as a district
judge. Henry Weinstein, L.A. Judge Confirmed to 9th Circuit Post Judiciary, L.A. Times, Aug. 1,
1998, at A18. By contrast, only Judge Andrew J. Kleinfeld and Judge Susan Graber from the
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Browning and Schroeder, spent lengthy periods in government service.308
The south boasts more national law schools from which top academics
can attract the attention necessary to be picked for the court.0 9 With a
few exceptions, fewer of the southern judges' biographies include the
mainstream city and statewide professional and public leadership
experiences that are de rigeur for their northern colleagues,10 but of
course, that is to be expected. Ninth Circuit judges in the northwest may
be big fish in their local communities, but no matter how big a fish one
is, it is tough to be a big fish in Los Angeles, let alone California. Big
fish in Los Angeles want to be governor or president, not Ninth Circuit
judges. Unlike many of their northern colleagues, most of the southern
Ninth Circuit judges are anonymous in the California cities whence they
come.
Who knows what are the ideal qualifications for a Ninth Circuit
judge? It is impossible to say whether the northwestern or southwestern
profile is preferable. It is a matter of taste. All this discussion suggests
that the communities, and specifically the legal communities from which
the two regions' judges come, are different.
Why the two legal communities are different is worthy of attention.
Obviously, these two groups of judges are not internally homogeneous.
The Reno judges, for example, would fit better with the Boise or
Portland judges than with the army from Los Angeles. The point,
however, is that there are more cultural differences between the north
and the south and between the northern judges and southern judges than
a few feet of snow or a grove of palm trees. The differences probably
have much to do with the make-up of the groups from which judges are
picked in these geographical areas (and are therefore not a mere accident
of court's current composition) because the groups from which these
northwest were judges prior to joining the Ninth Circuit, and Judge Kleinfeld's tenure as a U.S.
district judge was considerably shorter than the period he spent as a private practitioner, although he
did serve many years as a part-time magistrate.
308. Among the northwest judges, Judge Stephen Trott was a U.S. Attorney, and Judge Diarmuid
O'Scannlain spent a few years in government positions.
309. The court's academics are now senior judges, but if Professor William Fletcher from
Berkeley (one of President Clinton's nominees to court) is ultimately confirmed, he would be the
court's most recent active academic.
310. This is not to say that the southern judges are not involved in their local communities and in
state and national legal organizations. Far from it. There is a difference, however, between being a
state bar president and holding a leadership position in a less prominent and more specialized group.
Both are important, but they must have a different impact on the holder's view of himself and his
role in the community.
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judges are picked reflect enduring differences in the regions' legal
culture.3 What attracts the attention of judge pickers in the two
regions is different and as a result the circuit's southern judges are
more likely to be big-city, big-institution judges, while northern judges
are not.3 2 This is not a description of diversity; this is polarization, and
it is probably a fact of life in this huge circuit where the largest
communities are in the south.
313
Regional polarization is not one of the Ninth Circuit's healthier
attributes, particularly since at present it has the unhappy accident of
correlating with party backgrounds, thereby taking on an ideological
taint.31 4 It is not good when an "us against them" mentality emerges
among the citizens of the Ninth Circuit states, even if the judges
themselves do not necessarily view it that way. It is worse when that
mentality is reinforced by the culture of the court. The perceived, or
possibly even real, specter of a powerful region dictating to a
"misunderstood minority" breeds a distressing discontent which, if
unchecked, could be damning to the court's legitimacy.
Many court watchers have taken Senators Bums and Gorton's
comments that they want out from under the thumb of California judges
311. Where, for example, are the big firm lawyers in Idaho, Montana, and Alaska needed to
diversify the backgrounds of the northern judges?
312. Almost any la.'yer politically active in the correct party, who is also well respected for
cerebriality, has had a highly decorated career in one of a variety of acceptable career paths, and is
over age 40, is a realistic candidate for Ninth Circuit service. Given the number of possible
candidates, I suspect that it is difficult to hone the potential judge list from California to a
manageable size, which is probably why there are so many former state and federal judges on the
court; an easy way to distinguish oneself as a potentially good judge is to have been one already. By
contrast, it is fairly obvious how the President's judge pickers identify candidates from the northern
states: they look at lists of the most well respected lawyers in the one or two largest cities in the state
in question, then eliminate those who are not active in the correct party. Such a list would be
manageable to use as a database for choosing nominees.
313. The largest cities are in the south, so the differences in the available judge candidates are
different in the south than the north.
314. Seven of President Carter's 13 appointments went to California, so until very recently,
California simply has not been in line for many new judges. (Judge Boochever, a Carter appointee
from Alaska, moved to California for medical reasons upon taking senior status, adding to the
California contingent, and giving Alaska senators a compelling argument for a new judge in their
state during the Bush administration). Republican presidents had the opportunity to make most of the
Northwest's appointments, although President Clinton has recently made two. Bear in mind that the
Northwest's judges would have been fairly "conservative" regardless of which president made the
appointments, because a state's senior senator plays a large role in choosing judges from his state,
and the senior senators from the northwest have mostly been Republicans during this period.
Ideological polarization need not necessarily correlate with geography, however.
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whose thinking is "a little bit different 315 and assumed that those
senators' only thought is to be in a circuit with judges who conform with
the northwest's views on the death penalty, gun control, and the
environment."6 While that characterization may speak for some split
backers, it is an unfairly narrow characterization of complicated
impressions that manifest themselves in California domination rhetoric.
First, northwestern opinion is not exactly lockstep on these issues, nor is
southwestern opinion.317 Second, Bums and Gorton's concerns ring true:
in a region where federal law has a particularly profound effect on
people's daily lives, a federal court culture demonstrably different from
and sometimes at odds with theirs has the power to overwhelm them at
any time with the stroke of a pen. The concern may look narrowly
political, but it has broader roots, and even if those roots turn out not to
be planted in fertile soil, the flowers that grow from them are not pretty.
Moreover, geographical polarization suggests that severing the icebox
states from the Ninth Circuit would have more than a mere "political"
effect on outcomes. Only in law review articles does the legal culture of
which the judge was a part while practicing not affect her view of a case,
particularly if the judge is "of' the local community, as are most of the
Ninth Circuit's judges."' Other items on a judge's resume count too.
Judge Stephen Trott's firm lecture to prosecutors about the dangers of
using paid confidential informants as undercover agents sends a
particularly strong message both to practitioners and other judges,
precisely because he spent a long and successful career as a prosecutor
before going on the bench.319 It is a good example of how legal culture
and a judge's background can influence opinions in a constructive way.
In so many cases, ideas about standards of review, trust in district judges,
315. Roy L. Brooks, Reforming the Judiciary: Should Federal Courts More Reflect Regional
Interests?, San Diego Union Trib., Nov. 19, 1995, at G3.
316. Seeid.
317. Compare, e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 837-38 (9th Cir. 1996)
(en banc) (determining right to assisted suicide is benefit to terminally ill and thus lawful), rev'dsub
nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997), with Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D.
Or. 1995) (finding right to assisted suicide is burden to terminally ill and thus unlawful).
318. A few are not. Judge Stephen Trott is not an Idahoan and Judge Robert Boochever is not a
Californian. For a discussion of this issue, see Carol Ostrom, Fuming Senators Ready to Carve up
Ninth Circuit, Seattle Times, Nov. 2, 1997, at A 1.
319. United States v. Bemal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331 (9th Cir. 1993). In light of this opinion by a
successful former prosecutor, it is much harder for prosecutors to argue to judges, who might
otherwise have little knowledge of these things, that it is not possible to get a conviction without
paid confidential informants.
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faith in the adversary process, and concreteness versus abstraction in the
law have as much to do with outcomes as how a judge parses a statute or
synthesizes several cases. These differences in philosophy are related to
differences in backgrounds.
The court's en bane decision in United States v. Perez32 provides an
example of the differences background can make. All eleven judges
agreed that the plain error in this criminal case was one that the court
should not correct, but they divided six to five over why. The majority
struggled with the jurisprudential difference between "waived" and
"forfeited" error in recent Supreme Court precedent.32" ' The concurring
minority made an impassioned plea for the court to allow "defense
counsel leeway to manage their cases as they and their clients think
best," '322 within the moral constraint that "it is wrong for the defense to
ask a trial judge to do something, and then ask an appellate court to
reverse because the trial judge did what was requested."'3"
The majority opinion by Judge A. Wallace Tashima analyzes the case
in this tone:
In [United States v. Olano], the [Supreme] Court provides an
extensive framework for plain error review.... Olano does not,
however, specifically address the concept of invited error. From
this omission, the panel concluded that plain error review is
appropriate for invited errors.... Although Olano does not directly
address so-called "invited error," it certainly addresses the
difference between forfeited and waived rights.... Accordingly,
we cannot agree that Olano completely overruled our invited error
doctrine. Instead we must reformulate that doctrine to conform to
Olano's discussion of waiver and forfeiture.
Until now, our invited error doctrine has focused solely on
whether the defendant induced or caused the error.... We now
recognize, however, that we must also consider whether the
defendant intentionally relinquished or abandoned a known
right.... If the defendant has both invited the error, and
relinquished a known right, then the error is waived and
therefore unreviewable.3 4
320. 116F.3d 840 (9thCir. 1996).
321. Id. at 845-46.
322. Id. at 852 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
323. Id. at 853 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
324. Id. at 844-45.
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Contrast the style and emphasis with this from the concurrence by Judge
Andrew J. Kleinfeld:
Lawyers do not research every possible issue of law in every case.
Nor should they. A lawyer necessarily and properly exercises
professional judgment about how to allocate the limited time for
preparation in a way likely to produce the most benefit for the
client. These time allocation decisions are by logical necessity
made in partial or complete ignorance of what would be
accomplished if time were allocated differently. Sometimes
researching the law is a waste of time, while finding and talking to
a witness would produce a defense bonanza. Often there is not
enough time to do both the maximum possible extent. Experienced
lawyers usually know what they are doing and are acting wisely for
their clients, when they make their decisions about what to do, and
what need not be done, to prepare the case.325
Which of these styles one prefers is largely a matter of taste, but not
surprisingly, all the members of the concurring minority had spent long
careers in the general practice of law, clocking many hours in local
courtrooms on the other side of the bench.326 All but one practiced in
some of the smallest communities represented on the court. In the
majority were two judges who had each spent thirty-five years on the
appellate bench,327 two who had spent eighteen years or more as Ninth
Circuit judges,32 two long-time trial judges,329 and a lifelong
academician.33 All but one of the majority were from the largest cities in
the circuit.33" ' One case doth not broad principles make, but it seems
foolhardy to suggest that such differences in background and attitudes do
not produce opinions of a different tones, if not different results.
325. Id. at 851 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
326. They are Judges Procter Hug, Jr. (Reno), Andrew J. Kleinfeld (Fairbanks), Thomas G.
Nelson (Boise), David Thompson, (San Diego), and Stephen Trott (Boise).
327. Judges James R. Browning and Edward Leavy.
328. Judges James R. Browning and Harry Pregerson.
329. Judges Harry Pregerson and A. Wallace Tashima.
330. Judge John T. Noonan.
331. These differences are not completely regional. All the concurring judges are not from the
northwest, and all the judges in the majority are not from the southern part of the circuit. In fact, in
the spirit of our current fascination with diversity, it is a relief to discover that this attitudinal
polarization does not completely correlate with geography.
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Split critics argue that dividing the circuit to isolate the north-south
attitudes into different circuits would do violence to the federalizing
aspect of the circuit courts. 32 Circuit reorganization is about making
trade-offs, however, and the relative merits of "federalization"
maintained by a bloated circuit court of appeals are elusive in this case.
First, in the icebox scheme, each of the new circuits would have at least
three states. The several eastern circuits with only three states seem to
have managed rippingly without more, and they also seem to have
maintained a sufficiently consistent intercircuit law to support commerce
and region-wide activity.333 Second, federalization is not the concern it
was when the only federal presence for miles around might be a post
office. Federal institutions, with their ubiquitous local offices, abound.
We now look to Washington, D.C. to solve many of our problems, and
Congress has responded with innumerable federal laws.334 We are closer
and more connected than ever before. The trend is such that it is arguably
more federalism, not federalization, that we need. Finally, the icebox
split is not a proposal to create the federalization proponents'
nightmare-twenty circuits with only nine or ten judges each.335 All the
Ninth Circuit split would do is increase the number of regional circuits
from eleven to twelve. It is hard to see the damage to federalization in
this scenario.
Further, while the northern states have good reason to take a special
interest in federal law, as it has such a huge impact on their daily lives
and the fabric of their societies, they do not all have the same concerns.
Yuppies in Seattle, Mormons in Idaho, struggling logging communities
in eastern Oregon, native corporations in Alaska, ranchers in Montana:
only those to whom all of these groups are foreign could see them as
monolithic or homogeneous, either culturally or in their legal concerns.
The Twelfth Circuit would make a significant and perhaps bigger
contribution as a unifying force for these diverse groups than the current
Ninth Circuit, because the Twelfth would not have the stigma of being
"California's court."
"Federalization" seems like a noble value in high-minded public
policy debates, but it can be quite destructive to national loyalties when
332. See Baker, supra note 2, at 97; Hellman, supra note 31, at 282-85.
333. Bums, supra note 40, at 254.
334. On this point and its impact on the federal judiciary, see generally Wilkinson, supra note
105, at 1149-57.
335. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 2, at 72-73; Tobias, supra note 41, at 591 & n.64.
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one region begins to chafe under a yoke tightened by another. In fact, the
split might have a hitherto undiscussed positive effect on Californians
and California judges in particular. A court consisting of two or more
regions has the potential for domination, or perceived domination, by
one region over the other. The perception of domination can work both
ways. Californians and California judges may have some of the same
domination concerns about northwestern judges that the northwestern
senators express about Californians. If federalization comes at the price
of suspicion and perceived domination of either group by the other, the
marginal value of the federalization achievable by keeping the Ninth
Circuit together may not be worth it.
Moreover, those who fear the split because it will change their
preferred interpretations of federal law336 should take heart, and to those
who back the split in order to make federal law conform with local
preferences, I say: look again. History teaches that federal judges are
perfectly capable of determining and enforcing whatever the true spirit of
federal law, even when that spirit does not comport with their neighbors'
political hopes.337 How else could the Fourth and the old Fifth Circuits
have become such leaders in civil rights law?338 Those efforts in the
southeast were touch and go during the 1950s, '60s, and '70s, but they
would not have been any easier if judges from Massachusetts or New
York had been brought in to adjudicate civil rights disputes. Yet, that is
precisely what the Ninth Circuit does when it sends three Californians to
interpret ANCSA for Alaskans or three northwesterners to measure
Proposition 209 against the U.S. Constitution for Californians. Many
more like the ANCSA episode and the Ninth Circuit's "federalizing"
influence will not be able to repair the damage.
Federalization is a useful value and an important purpose for the
federal courts, but it is unclear how much it is worth in light of the many
other concerns about the court's current size and structure. Arguments
about diversity and federalization are at best of minimal concern, and at
worst are red herrings. The current Ninth Circuit is marked more by
336. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, The Proposal to Split the Ninth Circuit, 20 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 547
(1996).
337. See, e.g., J.W. Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School
Desegregation (1961); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, From Brown to Baake: The Supreme Court and
School Integration: 1954-1978 (1979).
338. See, e.g., Jack Bass, Unlikely Heroes (1981); Peltason, supra note 337; Wilkinson, supra
note 337. In fact, its swollen civil rights docket prompted the Fifth Circuit split debate in the 1970s.
See Baker, supra note 2, at 59.
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polarization than by diversity, and it makes sense to isolate the poles so
they quit bumping heads. The icebox split would also retain ample
federalizing influence over the region by reinforcing confidence in the
institution of the federal courts.339
IV. OTHER ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE SPLIT ARE
UNPERSUASIVE
The best defense is the best offense. The best arguments against the
split lose their force when one grasps a good understanding of the Ninth
Circuit's problems and their relationship to the circuit's size and
composition. Nevertheless, in the spirit of the wise politician's motto,
"leave no shot unanswered, ' 340 there is value in examining the few
remaining arguments against splitting the circuit to demonstrate their
lack of persuasive force.
A. The Split is Merely a Politically Motivated Attempt to Change the
Law in the Northwest
Response: Everything Congress does is "politically motivated." That
is the way the system works. As Professor Thomas Baker has pointed
out, "[u]ltimately, federal jurisdiction is about politics."34' Instead of
worrying too much about why politicians do things, maybe the rest of the
legal community should figure out whether the split would be a good
idea and take advantage of the political climate if it is. The "political
motivation" argument against a split is unpersuasive because there is
nothing inherently wrong with such a motivation.
Perhaps some northwestern lawmakers want a Twelfth Circuit that
will interpret the law differently than the current Ninth Circuit.342 This
view is not necessarily wrong. There is very little federal common law,
most federal law is statutory, and Congress wrote the statutes. That
Congress should take some interest in how judges interpret their work
product is not surprising. If Congress wants to use a tool with the
precision and efficiency of a meat cleaver to change how its statutes are
339. Unlike many of the other split structures proposed, the icebox split has the merit of
maintaining a federalizing influence in the new Ninth as well, with three states serving as a
counterweight to California.
340. Christopher Matthews, Hardball 117-30 (1990).
341. See Baker, supra note 2, at 85.
342. See id. at 100-01.
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interpreted, this is one of the tools the Constitution provides.343 On the
other hand, one instinctively recoils at the notion of Congress controlling
the outcomes of court cases by tinkering with circuit boundaries. It flies
in the face of our notions of an independent judiciary.
The "politicization" criticism has merit only if the new Twelfth
Circuit actually would interpret the law differently from the old Ninth.
Were the two circuits to produce different interpretations of the law, it
would probably reflect underlying jurisprudential differences among
substantial groups of judges masked by an accident of geography, which
does not seem likely. Nevertheless, to argue that the circuit should not be
split in order to avoid such different interpretations is simply an
argument for maintenance of the legal status quo and the legal
predictability that would follow. On the other hand, if the circuit were
split and the new Ninth and new Twelfth interpreted the law differently,
the two circuits would produce intercircuit conflicts that would highlight
the interpretive differences and therefore permit the appropriate legal
bodies to announce the "correct" interpretation. Predictability is an
important value, but maybe one of the reasons Congress is increasingly
interested in splitting the circuit is that it thinks the Ninth Circuit is
getting it predictably wrong.3" Unlike the circuit courts, the U.S.
Supreme Court is not exactly overworked.345 If the split would create
additional intercircuit conflicts, perhaps the Supreme Court needs to take
these cases and resolve the differences, Congress needs to amend the law
to be more clear, or the circuits need to keep struggling with these
issues.346 In any event, exposing differences is hardly a bad thing in
principle.347
343. See U.S. Const. art. III. Would it be better if Congress shut off the appropriations faucet to
the U.S. courts? Would it be better if the executive branch refused to enforce court decisions? Of
course not. If Congress is really concerned with how the Ninth Circuit interprets its decisions, it can
do any of the following: amend the statutes, which the Ninth Circuit might still interpret
"incorrectly;" alter the structure or jurisdiction of the court to force out decisions more of Congress's
liking; refuse to confirm nominees viewed as "untrustworthy;" or take one of the even more invasive
means described above. Splitting the circuit does not sound very intrusive in that context.
344. The reversal rate does not inspire confidence. See Carlsen, supra note 26.
345. See Posner, supra note 126, at 141-42.
346. It is not enough to argue that the Supreme Court will not take so many cases. Perhaps the
Supreme Court needs to see these intercircuit conflicts in sharper relief. Further, even if the Supreme
Court does not want to take on more work, that is not a reason to subject the people of the potential
Twelfth Circuit states to less satisfactory jurisprudence and judicial administration.
347. See Letter from Justice Anthony Kennedy, supra note 34, at 3 (stating that Supreme Court
welcomes intercircuit conflict as instructive). In fact, a 1986 New York University study argued
persuasively that deep intercircuit conflict was useful for the purpose of framing issues for the
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My own view is that this discussion is academic. Splitting the circuit
would not change the law much, and therefore, opposing the split on the
ground that a split would change the law is a red herring. The judges do
agree on most cases. There are fewer controversies on the court than one
might think.
Split opponents believe they have the moral high ground, but they
forget that trying to control the state of the law by controlling circuit
boundaries is judicial gerrymandering whether one is trying to change
those boundaries or whether one is trying to maintain the status quo. It is
not surprising that issue-oriented groups, such as environmentalists, are
in the forefront of the opposition to splitting the Ninth Circuit, just as
timber interests drool over the prospect of split legislation.34 From the
perspective of those who believe the fate of the spotted owl in Oregon or
Indian country in Alaska lies in the hands of judges from California and
Arizona, those states must be kept together in one circuit at all costs.349
Nevertheless, more detached observers must find a poverty to a debate
over circuit splitting driven by the bottom line in a few cases. In such a
debate, neither side has the market cornered on integrity.
B. The Icebox Split Will Simply Leave a Large Circuit with the Same
Problems It Purports to Solve
Response: Some argue that the icebox split will leave a large circuit
with many of the same problems the split purports to solve. This is a fair
criticism. The Icebox Circuit is not a complete solution to the Ninth
Circuit's ills. It cannot be. The Ninth Circuit faces some problems, such
as overwhelming filings, that a split alone just cannot solve. Further, the
Ninth Circuit that will remain after the northwestern states are cut away
will be very large. If fully staffing it becomes part of the deal, it could
quickly grow in judgeships to the approximate size of the understaffed
current Ninth. All the old problems of workload, collegiality, and
possibly polarization will be back in force.
A complete solution may not be necessary right now, however.
Merely delaying a crisis can sometimes avert it. Who knows what ten or
Supreme Court to solve once and for all for the whole country. Seth Estreicher & John Sexton,
Redefining the Supreme Court's Role: The Federal Judicial Process (1986).
348. See Tobias, supra note 35, at 1374; see also Valerie Alvord, Bid to Split 9th Circuit Will
Have Its Day in Court, San Diego Union Trib., Feb. 24, 1996, at A21.
349. See Tobias, supra note 336, at 547.
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twenty years will bring to the U.S. courts? The entire supply and demand
curve for justice may shift. We may have a national court of appeals.
Congress may pass new laws limiting the federal courts' substantive
jurisdiction. Congress may also develop a taste for splitting states to split
circuits, and carve up the new Ninth Circuit as it did the old. Twenty
years from now, the "litigious society" may be a thing of the past, and
young lawyers may be standing in bread lines. It would be silly to split
the Ninth Circuit if that can only be a short-term solution; but, if it would
improve the administration of justice in the northwestern states now
without damaging the possibility of a more extensive solution later, it is
sensible to split the circuit. The icebox split achieves this goal.
C. Why Not Wait for the More Extensive Solution, Especially ifIt
Involves Amalgamation of the Courts ofAppeals or Division of
Judges on Some Other Basis?
Response: As a practical political matter, Congress has no stomach for
nationwide realignment of the circuits or some other global solution. 5
Even if that would be the best thing for our appellate court system, it is
not going to happen any time soon.
Nor is it clear that a global suggestion is necessary. For twenty years
study commissions and jurists have warned that the sky is falling on our
circuit courts of appeals; yet, they have survived remarkably well.3"' If
the northwest states have problems that a sensible split could solve, those
states deserve at least a partial answer soon. Perhaps the Icebox Circuit is
it. Putting problems on hold until the elusive day when the need for a
global solution is apparent and the entire nation can agree on one is
unfair. Further, the idea that we should try every other possible idea for
reform before splitting the circuit sounds too much like a "save the Ninth
at all costs" sort of argument that lacks persuasive force.352
350. The Federal Courts Study Committee released a report in 1990 "stating without
endorsement" a number of alternate structural changes to the appellate courts including complete
realignment into smaller circuits, a national court of appeals, subject matter courts, a centralized
court of appeals, and consolidations of the current circuits. See Baker, supra note 2, at 42-43;
Joseph Weis, Jr., Disconnecting the Overloaded Circuits-A Plug for a Unified Court of Appeals, 39
St. Louis U. L.J. 455 (1995). None of these proposals went anywhere in Congress.
351. See Baker, supra note 2, at 32-43.
352. Chief Judge Hug has argued that Congress should consider changing the jurisdiction of the
federal courts or just the appellate courts to stem the tide of filings. Hug, supra note 30, at 293. Chief
Judge Hug's ideas make a lot of sense, but they must be viewed as more intrusive than splitting the
Ninth Circuit. A split should probably be tried first.
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One of the hardest things about making any decision is that no matter
how careful one is to "keep all options open," he necessarily closes some
doors behind himself. The icebox split has the merit of keeping the door
open to other splits or realignments in the future, because the Icebox
Circuit is the type of circuit structure one might choose if one were
starting from scratch. At some point, however, any change in circuit
boundaries closes or partially closes the door to some other change.
Closing the door on amalgamation is not much of a price to pay for a
sensible circuit now. Amalgamation would exacerbate many of the
problems discussed in this Article. At some point, Congress needs to
decide that certain types of answers-amalgamation for example-are no
answers, at least in the near term. If splitting the Ninth Circuit is a step
toward making that choice, then Congress should split the circuit.
D. Ninth Circuit Judges and the Ninth Circuit Bar Oppose Splitting
the Circuit
Response: Until recently, Ninth Circuit judges were unwilling to back
a split publicly. 53 Perhaps there is concern that supporting the split is an
implicit criticism of a past or the sitting Chief Judge.354 Those days are
over. Active Judges Diarmuid O'Scannlain,355 Andrew J. Kleinfeld,3 56
Stephen Trott,357 and Thomas Nelson,35 and senior Judges Joseph
Sneed359 and Eugene Wright36 have all gone on the record as favoring a
353. In fact, Senator Gorton stated of one of his split bills that "this bill has been taken personally
by the Ninth Circuit hierarchy-God bless their souls-who has [sic] set out to defeat this bill and
protect their power base." Tobias, supra note 35, at 1375 (1995) (quoting Senator Gorton).
354. Senator Bums takes an ungenerous view, claiming split opposition "curries favor" with the
Chief Judge. Bums, supra note 40, at 256 n.45.
355. O'Scannlain, supra note 95, at 948 ("That choice is, essentially, whether to encourage
further growth of the Ninth Circuit, impliedly promoting an amalgamation of the circuits into a
lesser number of circuits with larger courts of appeals, or to continue to restructure circuits into
more manageable regional entities.... I support the latter option."); see also Joint Statement,
supra note 127.
356. Donnelly, supra note 24, at B9 ("[W]e have become a laughingstock. It's not because we
have bad judges; it's because the circuit is too large and has too many cases.") (quoting Judge
Kleinfeld).
357. Joint Statement, supra note 127.
358. Id.
359 Statement ofJoseph T. Sneed III to the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal
Courts of Appeals (visited July 24, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearingslsanfranl
0529SNEE.htm>.
360. Joint Statement, supra note 127.
Washington Law Review
sensible split. Judge Sidney Thomas backed a split as a practitioner,
although his view has changed since he joined the court.36' All but Judge
Sneed hail from what would be the Icebox Circuit.
Further, stating that the Ninth Circuit bar opposes the split
362
minimizes the amount of support that exists for the project. Ninth Circuit
lawyers are notorious for speaking privately about their dissatisfaction
with the circuit, but refusing to go on record with those thoughts.363
Legal uncertainty also encourages litigation, which is sometimes good
for attorneys, but is almost never good for their clients.36 Interestingly,
the state attorneys general of seven of the states in the Ninth Circuit back
the split.36
5
A number of jurists outside the Ninth Circuit seem to back a sensible
split. Former Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger has urged
Congress to split the circuit because he believes the limited en banc
procedure is fundamentally flawed.366 Current Supreme Court Justice
Anthony Kennedy, a former Ninth Circuit judge, told Congress in April
1997 that the court is "too large to have the discipline and control that's
necessary for an effective circuit." '367 According to Supreme Court
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, "the circuit is simply too large" and
"some division or restructuring of the Ninth Circuit seems appropriate
and desirable." '368 Leaders of other appellate courts do not agree that the
usual Ninth Circuit judge's favorite panacea for the court's ills-more
judges-will help solve the circuit's problems.369
361. Prospective Judge Endorses Splitting 9th Circuit, Assoc. Press Pol. Serv., June 29, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 6733564 ("In the past I've served on a Montana State Bar committee
examining the question.... At that time, in 1989, I was in the minority in being in favor of splitting
the circuits."). Judge Thomas's position has changed since he joined the Court. See Statement of
Sidney R. Thomas to the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals
(visited July 24, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/seattle0527THO0.htm >.
362. See, e.g., Procter Hug, Jr., The Ninth Circuit Functions Well and Should Not Be Divided 5
Ninth Circuit Document (1998) (visited July 14, 1998) <http:/Iwww.ce9.uscourts.govAveblOCE>.
363. Carrington, supra note 156, at 210; Posner, supra note 126, at 137.
364. Bums, supra note 40, at 256.
365. Id.
366. See Baker, supra note 2, at 80.
367. Dave Hogan, Will the Ninth Circuit Remain Unbroken?, Oregonian, Aug. 17, 1997, at Al.
368. Letter from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to Justice Byron R. White, June 23, 1998 (visited
Sept. 24, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/submittedpdfloconnor.pdf>.
369. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 126, at 124-59 (current Seventh Circuit Chief Judge); Tjoflat,
supra note 122, at 70 (former Eleventh Circuit Chief Judge); Wilkinson, supra note 105, at 1164-78
(current Fourth Circuit Chief Judge).
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Finally, many of the northwestem states' senators support the split
along with many other elected officials. In fact, it sometimes seems that
the noisiest opposition to the split comes from California judges and
congressmen.37 That is understandable, but it is not a reason for anyone
else to oppose the split.
E. The Size of the Ninth Circuit Permits Useful Experimentation with
the Administrative Techniques for Large Circuits
Response: Our circuit courts of appeals are growing by historical
standards and the size of the Ninth Circuit in the past twenty years has
provided a forum to experiment with efficiency techniques in court
administration that, in many cases, worked.37" ' The information gleaned
from these experiments will be useful in the future, and it will be
unfortunate, to some extent, to lose this forum for experimentation.372
Policymakers have to put things in perspective, however. Is the
opportunity for experimentation in the Ninth Circuit more important than
the administration of justice and the legitimacy of the U.S. courts in the
northwest? Surely not. Further, the Ninth Circuit that will remain after
the split is not exactly miniature. It will still be useful as a laboratory for
future innovation.
F. The Start Up Costs Could Be Considerable, Including Money for
Nev Buildings
Response: One need not look cavalierly at a potential sixty million
dollar bill to the taxpayers, which is the amount some estimates suggest
would be needed in start-up costs for a new Twelfth Circuit, to support
the icebox split.373 If the problems outlined above with the current Ninth
Circuit are real, and a new Twelfth Circuit of the icebox states is the
solution, then let us hope that Congress will not balk solely due to the
cost, being "pennywise, but pound foolish."
The split can be achieved in a cost effective manner. Eventually, most
who oppose the circuit split raise issues such as new buildings, new staff
370. See, e.g., Whitney, supra note 25.
371. See Baker, supra note 2, at 82.
372. Tobias, supra note 41, at 594.
373. Bums, supra note 40, at 255.
Washington Law Review
and staff training as high costs of splitting the circuit.37 It is possible to
minimize those costs. The new Twelfth Circuit would be a relatively
small circuit of less than ten judges, so even if all the judges were sitting
on various panels at once with a couple of seniors, the maximum number
of panels that could sit at one time would probably be four. Therefore, if
the court mostly divided its sittings between Portland and Seattle, which
already host Ninth Circuit panels on a regular basis, the court would have
plenty of courtrooms and visiting office space for judges.a75 Huge new
courthouses are unnecessary.
As for central staff, even if no staff came from the old Ninth Circuit,
a relatively small amount of staff resources would be needed to support
an eight or nine judge circuit. Further, fewer staff might be necessary
on a per capita basis as well. After all, filings per judge are fewer in the
icebox states than in the southern states.376 The sizable staff devoted to
monitoring inconsistencies between panels would be partially expend-
able, because the volume problems that produce those inconsistency
concerns would not exist. Many administrative jobs would be less
complex because there would be fewer people to coordinate. It is
conceivable that the Twelfth Circuit could cut out a layer of
management or whole sections of staff without which the current Ninth
could not survive. 7
7
V. CONCLUSION
Hopefully, when the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the
Federal Courts of Appeals makes its final report to Congress in
December 1998, it will emphasize even more vehemently the many
positive aspects of separating the icebox states from the rest of the Ninth
Circuit. The icebox states and the rest of the Ninth Circuit each constitute
definable regions which should have their own courts of appeals.
374. See Baker, supra note 2, at 90; Hug, supra note 30, at 308; Tobias, supra note 35, at
1382-83.
375. Joint Statement, supra note 127, at 10.
376. Judicial Business, supra note 88.
377. See Drucker, supra note 129, at 638-40. Currently the Ninth Circuit's legal and
administrative staff is organized into departments such as death penalties, motions and screening,
and inventory, with deputy clerks or other high level managers overseeing those operations. There
are other departments, such as the circuit executive's office, that are necessary due to the circuit's
size and workload. Those departments are large on the Ninth Circuit due to its size, and managers
supervise many employees.
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Splitting the Ninth Circuit by creating the Icebox Circuit would
significantly decrease workload and administrative burdens in both
courts, improve collegiality in both circuits, and eliminate the
geographical polarization currently marring the Ninth Circuit's work.
The icebox split is the best available intermediate-term solution to the
Ninth Circuit's ills. The Commission has "almost" recommended an
icebox split for many of the reasons discussed in this Article. For that
reason, the icebox cometh.
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